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L Introduction
One of Congress's principal motivations for enacting the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA)' was to help disabled individuals enter into and remain
in the American workplace. In the ADA's "findings and purposes" section,
Congress stated that '"he Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with
disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independ-
ent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals."2 The legisla-
tive history is filled with the statements of senators and representatives
supporting the Act as a vehicle for bringing individuals with disabilities "into
the economic and social mainstream of American life."3 Legislators viewed
the ADA as a win/win situation: Decreased federal government expenditures
for supporting unemployed, disabled citizens and increased opportunities for
1. Americans withDisab'litisActof 1990,42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
2. Id. § 12101a(8).
3. S. REP. No. 101-116, at20(1989); see 136 CONG. REc. 10,860 (1990) (statement of
Sen. Conte) ("The investment [the ADA] represents will yield tremendous outcomes by
allowing millions of American citizens to work, compete, and contribute to our country in ways
they never have before.").
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the disabled to enter the workforce and to acquire the independence, self-
sufficiency, and dignity they rightly deserve.4
To effectuate this clearly articulated goal, Congress adopted a theory of
discrimination that requires employers to assess the qualifications of disabled
workers only after making reasonable accommodations for the known physical
and mental impairments of individuals with disabilities.5 The concept of
reasonable accommodation, although a familiar part of the ADA's older
statutory sibling, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,6 departs from other anti-
discriminafion statutes like Title VUI7 and the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act (ADEA).8 Both Title VII and the ADEA prohibit employers from
making adverse employment decisions "because of" race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, or age." These statutes, however, do not impose any affirma-
tive obligation on employers to assist employees in satisfactorily performing
the essential functions of the job. 0 While the ADA also bans discrimination
4. See 135 CoNG. R£c. 8998 (1989) (statement of Sen. Graham) (explaining rationale
underlying ADA); id. at 19,891 (statement of Sen. Riegle) ("Since the days of its inception, this
Nation has encouraged and valued independence and self-sufficiency. Their [sic] is no better
expression of these values than the Americans With Disabilities Act."); id. at 19,803 (statement
of Sen. Harkin) (stating that ADA empowers individuals with disabilities "to decide for
themselves what kind of life they want to lead, and provides a meaningful and effective
opportunity to become independent and productive members our of society").
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1994) (defining reasonable accommodation); id.
§ 12112(bX5XA) (defining discrimination to include "not making reasonable accommodations
to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability
who is an applicant or employee").
6. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-96 (1994) (prohibiting federal
employees, contractors, and recipients of federal aid from engaging in disability-based discrimi-
nation).
7. Title VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
8. Age Discrimination in EmploymentAct of 1967,29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994).
9. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(aX1) (1994) (making it unlawful employment practice for
employer "to fail or refuse to hire or ... otherwise discriminate against any individual...
because of such individual's age"); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(aX1) (1994) (making it unlawful
employment practice for employer "to fail or refuse to hire or.. . otherwise to discriminate
against any individual ... because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin").
10. A limited duty of reasonable accommodation arises under these two statutes only with
respect to religion, which is a protected trait under Title VIL See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1994)
(providing, similar to ADA, that employer must reasonably accommodate religious observances
and practices of its employees up to point of undue hardship). The reasonable accommodation
duty for religious observances, however, is much more limited than the ADA's requirement of
reasonable accommodation. See TWA, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) (ruling that
employer need not incur more than de minimis hardship in providing accommodation for
religious purposes).
1047
57 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1045 (2000)
"because of' disability," it goes beyond traditional anti-discrimination laws
with its requirement that employers must make favorable "reasonable accom-
modation" adjustments for the disabled.'
2
The presence of the reasonable accomnodation provision has led some
commentators to characterize the ADA as imposing an affirmative action
requirement. 3 One recent article, for example, described the ADA as "one of
the most radical affirmative action laws in recent United States history."'
4
Certainly, the requirement that employers take certain steps, short of undue
hardship, to assist qualified individuals with disabilities in obtaining or
retaining gainful employment is a form of affirmative action. Nevertheless,
it is evident from the legislative record and the bipartisan support for the
statute's passage that Congress believed that the reasonable accommodation
requirement was necessary to effectuate its goal of providing viable employ-
ment opportunities for the disabled.' Many commentators find this strong
Congressional support puzzling because Congress adopted the ADA at a time
when affirmative action in the race and gender contexts was under tremendous
attack.'
6
Despite Congress's support for reasonable accommodation as a necessary
tool for providing disabled individuals with tangible employment opportuni-
ties, recent case law has begun to question the "perceived fairness" of requir-
ing accommodations for individuals with disabilities.1 Negative affirmative
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994) (prohibiting discrimination "against a qualified
individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual").
12. See id. § 12112(bX5XA) (defining discrimination to include failure of "making
reasonable accommodation[s] to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability").
13. See CHADRISLAWRENCEI I&MARIMATSUDA,WEWON'TGOBACK MAKNGThE
CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 108 (1997) (referring to ADA as "the most radical affirmative
action program in the nation's history"); Sandra R. LevitskyReasonabtyAccommodatingRace:
Lessons from the ADA for Race-Targeted Affirmative Action, 18 LAW & INEQ. 85, 85 (1999)
(recognizing ADA's affrnrative action requirement).
14. See Levitsky, supra note 13, at 85 (commenting upon ADA afirmative action require-
ment).
15. The ADA passed both houses of Congress by wide margins. The House of Represen-
tatives passed the ADA with a vote of 403-20. 136 CONG. REC. 11,466-67 (1990). The Senate
voted to approve theADAwith a margin of 76-8. 135 CONG. REC. 19,903 (1989).
16. See LAWRENCE &MATSUDA, supra note 13, at 108 (concludingthatAmerican public
harbors divergent attitudes concerning race and disability); Levitsky, supra note 13, at 85-86
(commenting that although Americans generally oppose affirmative action measures designed
to achieve principles of racial equality, Congress passed ADA with overwhelming bipartisan
support during rise of affirmative action backlash).
17. See Alex B. Long, A Good WalkSpoiled: Casey Martin and the ADA 's Reasonable
Accommodation Requirement in Competitive Settings, 77 OR. L. REV. 1337, 1344 (1998)
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action rhetoric has begun to creep into recent ADA decisions,' particularly
when the accommodation at issue is reassignment to a vacant position. 9
These cases call into question an employer's duty to reassign disabled individ-
uals when doing so would either trump the rights of other better-qualified
workers or require an employer to deviate from facially neutral assignment
and transfer policies.
Whatever the reason for the recent attack on reasonable accommodation
in general and reassignment in particular, this Article will demonstrate that
challenging the ADA on affirmative action grounds is misplaced. Despite
some similarities with conventional forms of affirmative action, the concept
of reasonable accommodation as embodied in the ADA is significantly
different from affirmative action in other contexts. Accordingly, we believe
that the debate should move away from the politically charged label of affir-
mative action and towards establishing workable boundaries for determining
when an employer is required to reassign an employee with a qualifying
disability as a reasonable accommodation. This shift in focus is necessary if
the ADA is to fulfill its fundamental goal of assuring that individuals with
disabilities are enabled to participate fully in the American workplace.2
Part II ofthis Article provides an overview of reasonable accommodation
under the ADA with particular reference to the scope of an employer's duty
to reassign disabled employees. 2' Part III discusses two specific issues cur-
rently splitting the federal courts: (1) when, if ever, must an employer choose
a qualified individual with a disability over a better qualified applicant or
employee in filling a vacant position; and (2) when, if ever, may an employer
rely on its existing, non-discriminatory employment policies as a basis for
failing to reassign a disabled employee to a vacant position.22 Part IV then
(concluding that reasonable accommodation under ADA is "non-problematic" because of its
"perceived fairness"); see also LAWRENCE &MATSUDAsupra note 13, at 108 (noting American
public's acceptance of affirmative action for disabled despite significant costs imposed on
employers to reasonably accommodate disabled employees).
18. See infra Parts I.B.2 and ]IC.2 (discussing cases that have excused employer from
making reassignment accommodation because ADA does not permit preferential treatment in
favor of disabled employees).
19. See Ruth Colker, Affirmative Protections for People with Disabilities, Illness and
PareningResponsibilities Under UnitedStatesLaw, 9 YALE J.L. &FEMDM213, 222 (1997)
("The controversy surrounding whether or not the ADA is an 'affirmative action' statute has
largely centered on [the reassignment to a vacant position] requirement").
20. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(aX8) (1994).
21. See infra Part I (providing overview of ADA's reasonable accommodation provi-
sion).
22. See infra Part Ill (analyzing two ADA issues currently creating division among
federal courts).
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considers whether reasonable accommodation is a form of affirmative action
and, if so, whether preferential treatment in favor of the disabled nevertheless
is justified in light of the statutory language and policies of the ADA.'
Finally, Part V puts the affirmative action debate aside and suggests predict-
able guidelines for determining the appropriate scope of the reassignment
accommodation grounded in the fundamental policies underlying the ADA.24
I. Overview ofReasonable Accommodation and Reassignment
A. Reasonable Accommodation
1. The Role of Reasonable Accommodation
The reasonable accommodation requirement is unique to disability law.
With the exception of persons claiming discrimination on the basis of
religion,26 neither Title VII' nor the ADEA25 allows statutorily protected
persons to demand accommodations in their favor.' At most, such persons
can demand only equal treatment and an absence of discrimination.
23. See infra Part IV (examining whether reasonable accommodation is form of affirma-
tive action and whether preferential treatment favoring disabled employees is justified in light
of statutory language and policies ofADA).
24. See infra Part V (suggesting predictable guidelines for determining appropriate scope
of reassignment doctrine grounded in fundamental policies underlying ADA).
25. In addition to the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, applicable only to federal
employees, contractors, and grant recipients, included a similar reasonable accommodation
requirement 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-96 (1994). Congress modeled the ADA extensively after the
Rehabilitation Act and incorporated into the ADA many of the same anti-discrimination
principles. O.P EAN&J.ARTERTONDISABIDISCRMATIONINTHE WORKPLACE § 1.06
(1997).
26. See Title VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000ej) (1994) ("The term
'religion' includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an
employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or
prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct
of the employer's business."); see also TWA, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) (constru-
ing reasonable accommodation requirement for religion very narrowly and holding that
employer need not incur more than de minimis hardship in providing employee accommodation
for religious purposes).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1994).
28. Age DiscriminationinEmploymentAct of 1967,29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994).
29. See Pamela S. Karlan & George RutherglenDisabilitiesDiscrimination, andReason-
able Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 3 (1996) (stating that "under the civil rights statutes that
protect women, blacks, or older workers, plaintiffs... cannot insist upon discrimination in their
favor, disabled individuals often can") (footnote omitted); see also Long, supra note 17, at 1343
(observing ADA is set apart from other anti-discrimination statutes because of reasonable
accommodation concept).
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Under the ADA, the reasonable accommodation requirement plays a role
at several stages of the employment relationship.3° Most significantly for our
purposes, an individual has standing to assert an ADA claim only if the indi-
vidual is both disabled and qualified31 The ADA defines a "qualified individ-
ual with a disability' as "an individual with a disability who, with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions ofthe employ-
ment position that such individual holds or desires."32 This definition requires
employers to engage in a two-step inquiry: (1) identify the essential functions
of the job in question and (2) determine whether the individual can perform
those essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation.33
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the adminis-
trative agency charged with promulgating regulations to implement the statu-
tory language of the ADA,' defines essential functions as the "fundamental
job duties ofthe employment position," butnotthose functions that are merely
"marginal" in nature.35 The regulations state that a job function may be
considered essential because the position exists to perform that function, only
a limited number of employees are available to perform the job function,
30. Reasonable accommodation may be required in the following situations: (1) deter-
mining whether an individual is a qualified individual with a disability, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8),
12112(bX5) (1994); (2) deciding whether the individual poses a direct threat to the health or
safety of the individual or others, iel §§ 12111(3), 12113(b); and (3) making modifications or
adjustments to the job application process or work environment such that a disabled employee
can enjoy the benefits and privileges of employment as enjoyed by other similarly situated non-
disabled employees, id. § 12112(bX5).
31. See Stephen F. Befort & Holly Lindquist Thomas, The ADA in Turmoil: Judicial
Dissonance, the Supreme Court's Response, and the Future ofDisabiliy Discrimination Law,
78 OI. L. REV. 27, 33 (1999) (noting that to make prima facie case under ADA, "an applicant
or employee must establish that he or she is disabled, qualified, and has suffered an adverse
employment action because of his or her disability"); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994)
(delineating disability as first prong of prima facie case and defining disability as "physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an]
individual"). The focus of this Article is on the second and third prongs of the prima facie
case - whether the individual was qualified and if so, whether the employer discriminated
against the individual because of the employer's failure to provide reasonable accommodations
to that qualified individual.
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994) (defining qualifications of individual with disabil-
ity).
33. See Befort & Lindquist Thomas, supra note 31, at 35 (noting that inquiry is whether
individual can perform "essential functions" of job in question with or without reasonable
accommodation and defining "essential functions" as "fundamental job duties" of position not
"marginal" in nature).
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(1) (1994) (stating that "the Commission shall issue regulations
in an accessible format to cany out [this tide]").
35. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(nX1) (1999).
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and/or the function involves a high degree of specialization. 6 In this regard,
the ADA provides that "if an employer has prepared a written description
before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall
be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job."37
Once the essential functions of the position are identified, the employer
next must ask whether the disabled individual can perform these essential
functions without reasonable accommodation. Ifthe answer is in the affirma-
tive, then the individual is "qualified" under the statute. If the answer is in the
negative, then the employer has an affirmative obligation to provide the
individual with a reasonable accommodation unless doing so would cause the
employer to suffer an undue hardship. 8
The ADA excuses an employer from accommodating an individual with
a disability if the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on that
employer.39 The statute defines undue hardship as "an action requiting sig-
nificant difficulty or expense" 4 and provides a list of factors to consider in
determining whether the proposed accommodation would cause a particular
employer to suffer an undue hardship.4 Unless this defense is shown to exist,
36. Id. at § 1630.2(nX2).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994).
38. See Borkowski v. Valley Cent Sch. Dist, 63 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating
that "the plaintiff bears the burden of proving either that she can meet the requirements of the
job without assistance, or that an accommodation exists that permits her to perform the job's
essential functions").
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994) (stating that employer does not violate ADA
for failing to provide reasonable accommodation if employer can "demonstrate that the accom-
modation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered
entity").
40. Id. § 12111(IOXA).
41. Section 12111(10)(B) provides:
In determining whether an accommodation would impose an undue hardship on a
covered entity, factors to be considered include -
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this [Act];
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the
provision of the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons employed
at such facility, the effect on expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise
of such accommodation upon the operation of the facility,
(iii) he overall financial resources of the covered entity, the overall size of the
business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its employees; the
number, type, and location of its facilities; and
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the com-
position, structure, and functions of the workforce of such entity, the geo-
graphic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility or
facilities in question to the covered entity.
Id § 1211 1(I0)(B); see also Befort & Lindquist Thomas, supra note 31, at 37 (describing
undue hardship defense as "floating concept that varies with the nature and cost of the proposed
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an employer's failure to provide an accommodation that is available and rea-
sonable results in a violation of the statute.42
2. Types of Reasonable Accommodation
Reasonable accommodation is defined generally as "any change in the
work environment or in the way things are customarily done that enables an
individual with a disability to enjoy equal employment opportunities."'43 The
ADA provides an illustrative list of reasonable accommodations that encom-
passes four basic types of accommodations.'
(1) Making changes to existingfacilities. An employer's duty to modify
its facilities includes making both work and non-work employee areas accessi-
ble to a disabled employee.45 Modifications to restrooms, break rooms, and
lunchrooms thus may be required as reasonable accommodations.'
(2) Providing assistive devices or personnel. The statute lists the "ac-
quisition or modification of equipment or devices" and "the provision of quali-
fied readers or interpreters" as reasonable accommodations.47 The Interpre-
accommodation, the impact of the proposed accommodation upon the operation of the facility,
and the overall resources of both the facility in question and the employer in general").
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(bX5XA) (1994) (defining discrimination under ADA to
include "not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations
of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee"). The
federal courts of appeal are split as to the requisite burdens of proof in establishing a reasonable
accommodation. Compare Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 196 F.3d 979, 988-89 (9th Cir. 1999)
(holding that plaintiff bears burden of persuasion to show both existence and reasonableness
of proposed accommodation), vacated and reh 'g en banc granted, 201 F.3d 1256 (9th Cir.
2000) with Stone v. City of Mount Vernon, 118 F3d 92,98 (2d Cir. 1997) (commenting that
plaintiff need only establish existence of plausible accommodation with defendant then bearing
burden of proving that proposed accommodation is unreasonable) (citing Borkowski v. Valley
Cent Sch. Dist, 63 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1995) and Gilbert v. Frank, 949 F.2d 637, 642 (2d
Cir. 1991)), cerL denied, 522 U.S. 1112 (1998).
43. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) (1999).
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1994) (illustrating reasonable accommodations employer
may undertake). The term "reasonable accommodation" may include:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable
by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time, or modified work schedules, reassignment to a
vacant position, acquisition or modifications of equipment or devices, appropriate
adjustment or modification of examinations, training materials or policies, the
provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for
individuals with disabilities.
Id. The EEOC's Interpretive Guidance states that "[t]his listing is not intended to be exhaustive
of accommodation possibilities." 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) (1999).
45. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) (1999).
46. Id.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)3) (1994).
1053
57 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1045 (2000)
tive Guidance suggests that an employer may be required to permit a disabled
employee to utilize his or her own equipment or aids, such as a guide dog for
an individual who is blind, even though the employer itself may not be re-
quired to provide such an accommodation.'
(3) Job restructuring. This type of accommodation entails making
changes to an employee's current job.49 While an employer is not required to
reallocate essential job functions, s the employer may need to reallocate or
redistribute nonessential, marginal job functions that a qualified individual
with a disability is unable to perform." An employer also maybe required to
change when and how ajob function is performed, such as through the autho-
rization of modified or part-time work schedules."2
(4) Reassignment to a vacant position. The reassignment accommoda-
tion involves placing the disabled employee in a new position. This type of
accommodation goes a step beyond those listed above in that, instead of
making adjustments to enable an employee to perform his or her current job,
it transfers the disabled employee to an entirely different job. As a later
section discusses in greater detail, the additional effort required of an em-
ployer to place a qualified employee with a disability in a vacant position
combined with the greater impact on other employees' rights to fill that same
position makes reassignment a more burdensome and controversial accommo-
dation.
5 3
48. 29 C.F.R app. § 1630.2(o) (1999).
49. See Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284,1314-15 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Silberman,
J., dissenting) (explaining how job restructuring involves making accommodations to disabled
employee in disabled employee's current position).
50. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) (1999) ("An employer or other covered entity is not
required to reallocate essential functions.").
51. See id. (noting scope of employer reallocation duties). The Interpretive Guidance
demonstrates this type of accommodation with the following illustration:
[An] employer may have two jobs, each of which entails the performance of a
number of marginal functions. The employer hires a qualified individual with a
disability who is able to perform some of the marginal functions of each job but not
all of the marginal functions of either job. As an accommodation, the employer
may redistribute the marginal functions so that all of the marginal functions that the
qualified individual with a disability can perform are made a part of the position to
be filled by the qualified individual with a disability. The remaining marginal
functions that the individual with a disability cannot perform would then be
transferred to the other position.
Id.
52. See id. ("For example, an essential function customarily performed in the early
morning hours may be rescheduled until later in the day as a reasonable accommodation to a
disability that precludes performance of the function at the customary hour.").
53. See infra Part LB.1 (analyzing employer burden and controversy surrounding
accommodation through reassignment).
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3. The Interactive Process
EEOC regulations state that once an individual with a disability requests
an accommodation, the employer may need to consult with that employee in
ascertaining an appropriate reasonable accommodation.' The regulations
provide that the employer may initiate an "informal, interactive process" with
a qualified applicant or employee to "identify the precise limitations resulting
from the disability and potential reasonable acconnodations that could
overcome those limitations."'55
The EEOC's Interpretive Guidance provides more detail regarding the
suggested structure of this process. The Guidance states that the process
should be "flexible," involving "the individual assessment of both the particu-
lar job at issue, and the particular physical or mental limitations of the particu-
lar individual in need of reasonable accommodation." '56 The Guidance further
recommends that the parties jointly engage in a four-step "problem solving
approach" leading to the selection of "the accommodation that is most appro-
priate for both the employee and the employer."'"
Some appellate court decisions suggest that a party who fails to partici-
pate in the interactive process may be independently liable under the ADA."8
54. 29 C.F.R § 1630.2(oX3) (1999).
55. Id.
56. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (1999).
57. See id. (suggesting employer and employee employ certain problem solving methods
leading to selection of most appropriate accommodation for both parties). Specifically, the
EEOC's Interpretive Guidance provides:
When a qualified individual with a disability has requested a reasonable accom-
modation to assist in the performance of a job, the employer, using a problem
solving approach, should:
(1) Analyze the particular job involved and determine its purpose and essential
functions;
(2) Consult with the individual with a disability to ascertain the precise job-related
limitations imposed by the individual's disability and how those limitations could
be overcome with a reasonable accommodation;
(3) In consultation with the individual to be accommodated, identify potential
accommodations and assess the effectiveness each would have in enabling the
individual to perform the essential functions of the position; and
(4) Consider the preference of the individual to be accommodated and select and
implement the accommodation that is most appropriate for both the employee and
the employer.
Id.
58. See, e.g., Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist, 174 F3d 142, 162-63 (3d Cir. 1999)
(stating that employers cannot escape their duty to engage in interactive process with employees
requiring employers to make good faith attempt to seek accommodations), vacated and reh 'g
granted, No. 98-1273, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 19572 (3d Cir. Aug. 18, 1999); Beck v. Univ.
of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F3d 1130, 1135-36 (7th Cir. 1996) (concluding employer has "at
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Most courts, however, reject this position and hold that liability will arise only
when an employer has failed as a matter of substance to identify and imple-
ment a reasonable accommodation that would enable a disabled employee to
perform adequately in the workplace.59 A recent Eighth Circuit decision
stakes out something of a middle position in its finding that an employer's
failure to engage in the interactive process constitutes prima facie evidence of
bad faith sufficient to deny an employer's motion for summary judgment.6'
B. Reassignment to a Vacant Position
1. The Most Controversial Accommodation
Of all the accommodations listed in the ADA,' the reassignment accom-
modation has generated the most litigation and fueled the greatest amount of
controversy. For example, the federal courts have split on at least four issues
concerning the scope of an employer's reassignment duty: (1) whether the
reassignment accommodation is available only to disabled employees who are
qualified to perform their current job,62 (2) whether an applicable collective
least some responsibility" to participate in interactive process and that courts must consider
whether bad faith is present in any hampering of interactive process and "assign responsibility"
accordingly).
59. See, e.g., Rehling v. City of Chicago, 207 F.3d 1009, 1016 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting
that no liability arises from failure of interactive process alone because interactive process is
merely means of accomplishing accommodation of disabled people in workplace and not end
in and of itself); Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 196 F.3d 979,993-94 (9th Cir. 1999) (commenting
that employer's decision not to participate in interactive process may place employer at peril,
but does not expose employer to liability independent of failure to accommodate individual
employee's disability); Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 285 (11th Cir. 1997) (opining
that purpose of ADA is not to punish employers who fail to participate in interactive process
if employers could in fact make no reasonable accommodation for individual employee's
disability).
60. See Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 952 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding
prima facie evidence of employer bad faith in employer's refusal to engage in interactive
process).
61. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (illustrating concept of reasonable accom-
modation).
62. A majority of circuit courts addressing this issue have held that an employer must
consider reassigning an employee to a vacant position provided the disabled employee can show
that the disabled employee is qualified for that position even though the employee is no longer
able to perform the essential functions of the current job. See Feliciano v. Rhode Island, 160
F.3d 780, 786 (1st Cir. 1998) ("The determination that appellant cannot perform the essential
functions of herjob... does not end the analysis."); Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284,
1301 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en bane) (stating that employee seeking reassignment is within ADA if
employee can perform functions of position to which employee seeks reassignment); Gaul v.
Lucent Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 576, 580 (3d Cir. 1998) (same); Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 95
F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[The ADA may require an employer to reassign a disabled
employee to a different position as reasonable accommodation where the employee can no
1056
REASSIGNMET UNDER THE ADA 1057
bargaining agreement (CBA) trumps the ADA when the reassignment of a dis-
abled employee violates the seniority rights of another employee under a CBA
provision,63 (3) whether the ADA requires that an employer transfer a disabled
employee to a vacant position despite the superior qualifications of another
applicant or employee who also desires that position," and (4) whether the
reassignment provision compels employers to set aside or make exceptions to
its nondiscriminatory transfer and assignment policies.65 While the federal
courts now appear to be nearing consensus onthe first two issues, the division
of opinion with respect to the latter two issues - the subject of this Article -
appears to be widening.
longer perform the essential functions of their [sic] current position."), affld in relevant par4
rev'd in part, 213 F.3d 365 (7th Cir. 2000); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108,
1112, 1114 (8thCir. 1995) (same). But see Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800,
810 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that employee was not qualified individual with disability because
employee was no longer qualified to perform essential functions of employee's current job);
Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 284 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that employer is not obligated to
reassign disabled employee "when the employee is unable to meet the demands of his present
position"); Martin v. Lockheed Martin Missiles & Space, No. C96-4620 FMS, 1998 WL
303089 at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 1998) (holding that employee was not qualified individual with
disability because employee was no longer qualified to perform essential functions of em-
ployee's current job); Cheatwood v. Roanoke Indus., 891 F. Supp. 1528, 1538 (D. Ala. 1995)
(same). For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Befort & Lindquist Thomas, supra note
31, at 55-59 (discussing reassignment to vacant position when employee cannot perform
functions of current position even with reasonable accommodation).
63. The majority of courts addressing this issue have adopted a per se rule that employers
are not required to violate an applicable seniority provision in a CBA in order to comply with
the reassignment accommodation under theADA. See Lujan v. Pao. Mar. Assoc., 165 F.3d 738,
743 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that plaintiff's proposed accommodation would be barred if it
violated bona fide seniority system); Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 83 (3d Cir. 1997) ("[A]n
accommodation to one employee which violates the seniority rights of other employees in a
collective bargaining agreement simply is not reasonable."); Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,
117 F.3d 800, 810 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding "that the ADA does not require employers to take
action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining
agreement"); Eckles v. Consol. Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041,1051 (7th Cir. 1996) (same); Benson
v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108,1114 (8th Cir. 1995) (same); Milton v. Scrivner, Inc.,
53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that plaintiffs' collective bargaining agreement
prohibits transfer to another job because plaintiffs lack requisite seniority). But see Aka v.
Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 116 F.3d 876, 894-95 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (rejecting per se approach and
adopting balancing approach to resolve conflict between CBA and ADA), reh'g en banc
granted andjudgmentvacated, 124 F.3d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Emrick v. Libbey Owens-Ford
Co., 875 F. Supp. 393, 396 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (finding that per se rule does not apply to ADA
cases). For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Befort & Lindquist Thomas, supra note
31, at 59-61 (discussing transfers in violation of collective bargaining agreements).
64. See infra notes 108-79 and accompanying text (discussing relevant case law on this
issue).
65. See infra notes 184-224 and accompanying text (discussing relevant case law on this
issue).
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Several reasons may account for the additional scrutiny given to the
reassignment accommodation. First, the reassignment obligation is a dutythat
was not recognized prior to the adoption of the ADA. Although the ADA
closely tracks the statutory language of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and
its interpretive case law,67 the ADA departs from its older statutory sibling by
expressly including "reassignment to a vacant position" in its list of reason-
able accommodations.s The Rehabilitation Act required reassignment only
if it was available under an employer's existing policies.69 Otherwise, reas-
signment was a permissible, not a required, accommodation. ° The lack of
clearly delineated standards for reassigning qualified individuals with disabili-
ties under the Rehabilitation Act may explain some ofthe current struggle that
the federal courts are experiencing in defining the scope of this new accom-
modation under the ADA.7'
Second, reassignment has a greater impact on the rights of non-disabled
employees than other accommodations listed in the ADA. For example, an
employer's obligation to make existing facilities accessible to a disabled
employee imposes obligations on the employer but it "has no immediate
impact on non-disabled employees."72 Likewise, job restructuring involves
66. 29 U.S.C. § 701-96 (1994).
67. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (indicating that ADA was closely modeled
on Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)B) (1994) (listing "reassignment to a vacant position" as
reasonable accommodation).
69. See Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273,289 n.9 (1987) (summariz-
ing reassignment duty under Rehabilitation Act). In its Arline decision, the Supreme Court
stated:
Employers have an affrmative obligation to make a reasonable accommodation for
a handicapped employee. Although they are not required to find another job for an
employee who is not qualified for the job he or she was doing, they cannot deny an
employee alternative employment opportunities reasonably available under the
employer's existing policies.
Id.; see also Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 467 (4th Cir. 1987) (summarizing reassignment duty
under RehabilitationAct); 45 C.F.R. §1614.704 (1991).
70. See Jeffrey S. Berenholz, Note, The Development ofReassignment to a VacantPosi-
tion in the Americans with Disabilities Act, 15 HOFSTA LAB. & EMP. L.J 635, 639 (1998)
(collecting cases).
71. Nevertheless, Congress clearly intended to go beyond the Rehabilitation Act by ex-
pressly providing in the text of the ADA that reasonable accommodation may include "reassign-
ment to a vacant position." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1994). Congress's commitment to reassign-
ment as an accommodation for the disabled was further evidenced when Congress amended the
Rehabilitation Act in 1992 to expressly include reassignment as an accommodation. See 29
U.S.C. § § 791(g), 794(d) (1994), amended by Pub. L. No. 102-569, tit V, § 506 (1992) (recog-
nizing reassignment accommodation).
72. See Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en bane)
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making adjustments for a disabled employee in his current position that, again,
would have little impact upon the rights of other employees.73 Although an
employer's reallocation of non-essential, marginal functions may alter some
of the tasks other employees perform in the workplace, such an accommoda-
tion does not necessarily result in a net increase of work duties for the non-
disabled employee. 4 In contrast, reassignment may impose tangible losses on
other employees because an employer's placement of a disabled employee
into a vacant position necessarily deprives other employees of the possibility
of filling that position. Viewed in this light, the reassignment accommodation
has the effect of providing a preference to the rights of the disabled over those
of the non-disabled.75
2. EEOC Guidelines on Reassignment
As with any part ofthe ADA, comprehension of a particular provision is
not complete without reference to the EEOC's interpretive gloss. In addition
to its formal regulations,76 the EEOC has promulgated several interpretive aids
that provide substantial guidance on the scope of the reassignment accommo-
dation. These aids include the Interpreive Guidance of Title I," Technical
AssistanceManual,78 andEnforcement Guidance onReasonableAccommoda-
tion and Undue Hardship, recently promulgated in March 1999.11 Taken to-
gether, these guidelines establish a number of basic principles that the courts
(Silberman, J., dissenting) (analyzing impact of employer's ADA obligations on non-disabled
employees).
73. See id. at 1315 (observing that job restructuring and part time and modified work
schedules involve accommodations of employee's current position and "have no direct effect
on non-disabled employees or applicants").
74. The reallocation is a trade-off of marginal job functions between the disabled and
non-disabled employee: The non-disabled employee picks up those marginal functions that the
disabled employee cannot perform and the disabled employee picks up those functions that he
or she can perform from the non-disabled employee. See supra note 51 and accompanying text
(illustrating this reallocation).
75. See Aka, 156 F.3d at 1315 (Silberman, ., dissenting) (noting that in contrast to other
types of accommodations listed in ADA, reassignment infringes on rights of non-disabled em-
ployees).
76. See 29 C.F.L §§ 1630.1-1630.16 (1999) (providing for implementation ofADA).
77. 29 CXFYR app. §§ 1630.1-16 (1999) [hereinafterInterpretive Guidance].
78. EQUALEMPLOYMENTOPPoRTuNnYCOMMISSION,ATECHNICALASsISTANCEMAN-




ACT, EEOC Compliance Manual (CCH) 6908, at 5435 (Mar. 1, 1999) [hereinafter ENFoRCE-
MENT GUIDANCE].
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generally have accepted as delimiting the parameters of the reassignment
accommodation.8"
First, reassignment is required only for current employees, not appli-
cants s' Although the language of the statute makes no distinction between
employees and applicants in this regard, the EEOC follows the legislative
history2 in concluding that "reassignment is not available to applicants.1
83
Second, "[r]eassignmentis the reasonable accommodation of lastresort."'
The Enforcement Guidance, for example, provides that reassignment "is
required only after it has been determined that: (1) there are no effective
accommodations that will enable the employee to perform the essential fimc-
tions of his/her current position, or (2) all other reasonable accommodation
would impose an undue hardship."8"
Third, an employer is under no obligation to reassign. a disabled em-
ployee unless a position is truly vacant."6 The Enforcement Guidance defines
a vacancy as a position that is either available when the employee requests a
reasonable accommodation or one that the employer is aware will become
available within a reasonable time.s The regulations further explain that a
position is considered vacant "even if an employer has posted a notice or
announcement seeking applications for that position."88 An employer is not
required to "bump" another employee in order to create a vacancy,8 9 nor is an
employer required either to create a new position for a disabled employee or
to promote a disabled employee to a higher graded position."
80. See John E. Murray & Christopher J. Murray, Enabling the Disabled: Reassignment
and the ADA, 83 MARQ. L. REV. 721,731-32 (2000) (noting consensus among federal courts
concerning certain steps that employers are not obligated to take in order to comply with
reassignment requirement).
81. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) (1999) ("Reassignment is not availableto applicants.").
82. See HR. REP. No. 485 (11), at 56 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CAN. 303, 338
(referring to reassignment for employees, but not applicants).
83. 29 C.FR. app. § 1630.2(o) (1999) ("Reassignment is not available to applicants.").
84. ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 79, at 5453; see 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o)
(1999) (providing employer reassignment duties under ADA reasonable accommodation pro-
vision).
85. ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 79, at 5453; see 29 C.FYR app. § 1630.2(o)
(1999) (stating that "[i]n general, reassignment should be considered only when accommodation
within the individual's current position would pose an undue hardship").
86. See ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 79, at 5453 (defining "vacant").
87. See id. (defining "vacant"); see also 29 CX.R. app. §1630.2(o) (1999) (suggestingthat
what constitutes reasonable amount of time should be determined in light of totality of circum-
stances).
88. ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 79, at 5453.
89. Id. at 5453-54.
90. Id. An employer, however, may have a duty to reassign a disabled employee to a
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Fourth, even if a position "vacancy" exists, an employer need not reas-
sign a disabled individual unless he or she is "qualifled" for the new
position.9 Stated otherwise, the disabled employee must demonstrate that he
or she satisfies the requisite job requirements and is capable ofperforming the
position's essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation? 2
Finally, as with all the accommodations listed in the ADA, an employer
has no obligation to reassign a disabled employee if doing so would result in
an undue hardship? 3 Taken together, these measures limit the potential reach
of the reassignment accommodation and cushion its potential negative impact
on both the employer and other employees.
I1. Conflicting Case Law Concerning the Scope of the
Reassignment Accommodation
A. The Disputed Issues and the EEOC's Position
Despite EEOC efforts to delineate the contours of the reassignment
accommodation, a number of courts have gone beyond the guidelines to
interpret the reassignment obligation in a more narrow fashion. This Article
focuses on two of the more recent court-imposed limitations. Several courts
have held that the reassignment accommodation does not require employers
to pass over better-qualified applicants or co-workers in filling vacant posi-
tions,9' nor does it require employers to violate their non-discriminatory
transfer and assignment policies. 5
lower graded position as a reasonable accommodation. See 29 C.FIL app. § 1630.2(o) (1999)
("An employer may reassign an individual to a lower graded position if there are no accommo-
dations that would enable the employee to remain in the current position and there are no vacant
equivalent positions for which the individual is qualified with or without a reasonable accom-
modation.").
91. See ENFORcEmENT GuIDANCE, supra note 79, at 5452 (exploring employer reassign-
ment duty when employment vacancy occurs); see also supra note 62 and accompanying text
(discussing circuit split on issue of whether disabled employee qualifies for reassignment even
though employee can no longer perform essential functions of employee's current position).
92. See ENF RCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 79, at 5452-53 (defining "qualified"); see
also Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Auto., Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 678 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that in
determining those positions for which disabled employee may be qualified, "[tihe employer must
first identify the full range of alternate positions for which the individual satisfies the em-
ployer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory prerequisites, and then determine whether the employee's
own knowledge, skills, and abilities would enable her to perform the essential functions of those
alternate positions, with or without reasonable accommodations").
93. See infra notes 286-90 and accompanying text (discussing undue hardship defense).
94. See infra Part IMB.2 (discussing cases which do not require employers to give
preference to disabled employees in filling vacant positions).
95. See infra Part ]I.C2 (discussing cases which do not require employers to violate
transfer and assignment policies).
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These decisions prompted the EEOC to weigh in on the matter in its
March 1999Enforcement Guidance.6 Inthis Guidance, the EEOC responded
directly to this developing case law, affirmatively stating that the ADA's
reassignment mandate means that a disabled employee is entitled to placement
in a vacant position provided that the disabled employee is qualified for the
job.' The Enforcement Guidance, structured in a question and answer format,
provides the following exchange:
Q: Does reassignment meanthatthe employee is permitted to compete for
a vacant position?
A- No. Reassignment means that the employee gets the vacant position if
s/he is qualified for it. Otherwise, reassignment would be of little value
and would not be implemented as Congress intended.9
The Enforcement Guidance also addresses the issue of employer policies:
Q: Must an employer offer reassignment as a reasonable accommodation
if it does not allow any of its employees to transfer from one position to
another?
A: Yes. The ADA requires employers to provide reasonable accommoda-
tions to individuals with disabilities, including reassignment, eventhough
they are not available to others. Therefore, an employer who does not
normallytransfer employees would still haveto reassign an employee with
a disability, unless it could show that the reassignment caused undue
hardship. And, ifan employer has a policy prohibiting transfers, it would
have to modify thatpolicy in order to reassign an employee with a disabil-
ity, unless it could show undue hardship."
Unfortunately, the degree to which courts will defer'00 to EEOC guide-
lines has become less clear as a result of the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc101 In Sutton, the Court declined to follow
the EEOC's position on the issue of whether mitigating measures should be
taken into account when determining an individual's disability under the
96. See ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 79, at 5454 (exploring employer reassign-
ment duties under ADA).
97. See id. (exploring employer reassignment duties underADA).
98. Id. at 5455-56.
99. Id. at 5454.
100. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,433-34 (1971) (noting that viewpoint
of administrative agency charged with statutory enforcement is generally entitled to great defer-
ence). In an oft-cited decision, the Supreme Court held that when a statute is silent or ambigu-
ous, a reviewing court should adhere to an agency's regulatory interpretation if based on a
permissible construction of the statute. See Chevron U.S.L, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (outlining lower court review of agency regulatory interpreta-
tions).
101. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
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ADA' °2 The Court, holding that disability status should be assessed only
after considering the impact of mitigating measures, rejected the EEOC's
opposite reading "as an impermissible interpretation of the ADA2 1 °3 The
Supreme Court's lack of deference to the EEOC's interpretation, expressed
in the Interpretive Guidance,"' could seriously undermine effective applica-
tion of the ADA and diminish predictability if lower courts follow the Su-
preme Court's lead." 5
Some courts have followed the EEOC's recent directives concerning
reassignment, agreeing that for the reassignment accommodation to have any
viability, a disabled employee should not be required to compete for the
vacant position and that some modification of facially neutral transfer apd
assignment policies may be necessary' °6 Other courts, however, refuse to
defer to the EEOC on these issues, remaining unpersuaded that the scope of
reassignment requires employers to abandon their legitimate business interests
in hiring the best-qualified workers and maintaining uniform employer poli-
cies. For these courts, the EEOC's interpretation inappropriately turns the
ADA into an engine for affirmative action.
This Part summarizes the case law addressing the two reassignment
issues currently splitting the federal courts: (1) when, if ever, must an em-
ployer choose a qualified individual with a disability over a better qualified
applicant or co-employee; and (2) when, if ever, may an employer rely on its
non-discriminatory employer policies as a basis for declining to reassign a
disabled employee to a vacant position. It is clear from the numerous en banc
reviews and impassioned dissents that these issues inspired divisiveness
among the courts.
B. Disabled Employee vs. Better-QualifiedApplicantEmployee
1. Disabled Employee Prevails
Federal courts currently are split regarding the issue of whether an
employer must reassign a disabled employee to a vacant position despite the
102. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,482 (1999) (holding that employee
disability status should be assessed only after consideration of impact of mitigating measures).
103. Id.
104. See 29 CXF.R app. § 1630.20) (1999) (suggesting that mitigating measures should
not be considered in determining disability status under ADA).
105. See Befort & Lindquist Thomas, supra note 31, at 94-97 (discussing impact of Sutton
on issue of agency deference).
106. See infra Part II.B.1 (exploring cases favoring disabled employees in reassignment
context).
107. See infra Part lI.B.2 (exploring cases favoring employer's legitimate business
interests in hiring best-qualified employees and maintaining uniform employment policies).
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superior qualifications of another applicant or employee. Only the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has answered this question directly in the
affirmative,1°8 but in reaching its decision, that court relied heavily on an
earlier decision of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals that,
although not expressly deciding the issue, indicated strong support for an
interpretation of the reassignment accommodation similar to the EEOC's
recomimendation.1' 9
a. Aka v. Washington Hospital Center
In an en banc decision, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals expressed the
view that reassignment under the ADA requires something more of an em-
ployer than simply allowing a disabled employee to compete equally with
other job applicants for a vacant position."' The plaintiff, Etim Aka, a 56-
year-old Nigerian immigrant, had worked as an operating room orderly at
Washington Hospital Center (WHC) for nineteen years before undergoing
bypass surgery as a result of heart and circulatory problems."' After Aka
spent six months in rehabilitation, Aka's doctor told him he could return to
work provided that his job involved only a "light or moderate level of exer-
tion.""' 2 The physical demands of Aka's job as an orderly did not meet this
limitation, so Aka requested a transfer to a job that satisfied his medical
restrictions." 3 The hospital declined Aka's transfer request and placed him
on an eighteen-month job search leave, informing him "it was his responsibil-
ity to review WHC's job postings and to apply for any vacant jobs that inter-
ested him.""' 4 Aka applied and interviewed for numerous positions within the
hospital and, although he met the minimal qualifications for these positions,
WHC rejected him each time in favor of a more qualified non-disabled fellow
employee.
1 5
108. See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1164 (10th Cir. 1999) (en bane)
(interpreting ADA to mandate reassignment of disabled employee in spite of superior qualifica-
tions of non-disabled employees and applicants).
109. See Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1305 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en bane)
(opining that ADA reassignment provision requires more than merely giving disabled employee
opportunity to compete equally with other job applicants for vacant positions).
110. See id. (noting that such minimal obligations on employers would render reasonable
accommodation provision ofADA "a nullity").




115. Id. at 1287. Aka applied for a Financial Manager position but WHC did not grant him
an interview. Id. After taking the advice of a personnel employee to apply for "less elevated
positions," Aka applied for a position as a Central Pharmacy Technician and four File Clerk
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Aka filed suitinthe United States District Courtforthe District of Colum-
bia alleging, among other things, that the hospital's failure to reassign him to
one of the vacant positions violated the ADA." 6 The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendant, but a panel of the D.C. Circuit later
reversed and remanded Aka's reasonable acconumodation claim."' The appel-
late court then granted the hospital's request to rehear the case en banc."'
The court addressed the question of whether a seniority provision in a
collective bargaining agreement precluded Aka's reassignment request." 9 The
court remanded that issue to the district court to determine whether a different
provision in the CBA pertaining to the reassignment of employees who
become "handicapped" operates as an exception to the seniority clause. 2° The
majority then addressed the dissent's position that, irrespective of the CBA,
the hospital did not violate the ADA because Aka's only right in applying for
the vacant positions was to be treated equally with all the other applicants.'
Otherwise stated, the dissent contended "a disabled employee is never entitled
to any more consideration for a vacant position than an ordinary applicant,
because according the disabled employee any kind of help would be a prohib-
ited preference.' 2
The majority rejected the dissent's position on several fronts."ns First, the
court looked at the ADA's statutory text and concluded that the natural
meaning of the word "reassign" necessarily means something more than
simply allowing an employee to apply for a job like anyone else. 24 The court
reasoned that an employee who applies for and obtains a job elsewhere in the
company would not be described as having been "reassigned.''M2s Instead, 'tthe
core word 'assign' implies some active effort on the part of the employer."'
26
position openings. Id. WHC interviewed Aka for the Central Pharmacy Technician position,
but the hospital hired another employee within the hospital. Id. Aka also interviewed for all
four File Clerk positions, but in each case, the hospital hired less senior but more qualified
employees for the positions. Id
116. IJ
117. Id.
118. M at 1288.
119. Id. at 1301-03.
120. See id. (discussing potential conflict between collective bargaining agreement and
ADA).
121. Id. at 1304.
122. See id. at 1314-15 (Silberman, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress never intended
ADA to create preference for disabled employees).
123. Id. at 1304.
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The majority also rejected the dissent's position that placing a disabled
employee in a vacant position despite the superior qualifications of other
applicants amounts to a prohibited preference."2 The majority's review of the
legislative history revealed that Congress intended disabled employees to be
treated differently than other job applicants." Summarizing its findings, the
majority opinion stated: "Although the ADA's legislative history does warn
against preferences for disabled applicants, . . . it also makes clear that reason-
able accommodations for existing employees who became disabled on the job
do not fall within that ban."1 The majority then noted that the recognized
limitations already placed on the reassignment accommodation adequately
limit the disruption associated with that accommodation.13
The D.C. Circuit's decision in Aka, while lending support to EEOC
policy perspectives, fell short of formally endorsing the agency's conclusion
that the ADA automatically compels the reinstatement of a disabled employee
who at least minimally meets the requirements of a vacant position. While
soundly disagreeing with the dissent's claim that the ADA only requires an
employer to permit a disabled employee to compete equally with other appli-
cants for a vacant position, the Aka majority failed to explain precisely what
additional "active effort" employers must undertake in order to comply with
the ADA's reassignment duty.'
b. Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc.
The Tenth Circuit's en bane decision in Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc.13
2
is the leading case in favor ofreading the ADA as mandating the reassignment
of a disabled employee in spite ofthe superior qualifications of another appli-
127. See id (discussing Congressional intent and cases dealing with treatment of disabled
employees); see also id. at 1315 (Silberman, J., dissenting) ("If the Congress had intended to
grant a preference to the disabled - a rather controversial notion - it would certainly not have
done so by slipping the phrase 'reassignment to a vacant position' in the middle of this list of
reasonable accommodations.").
128. See id. at 1304 (examining legislative history ofADA).
129. Id. at 1305 (citing to ER. REP. No. 485 (11), at 56, 63 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.CA2N. 267,338,345) (emphasis in original).
130. See Aka, 156 F.3d at 1305 (noting several circumstances in which employer is not
required to reassign disabled employee). Some of these circumstances include: (1) when the
employee is not "otherwise qualified" for the reassigned position; (2) the reassignment poses
an undue hardship on the employer, (3) if no "vacant" position exists; (4) when bumping of
another employee would result; and (5) when a tranffer would violate a legitimate non-discrimi-
natory policy. Id.
131. See id at 1304 (stating that core word "assign" implies some active effort on part of
employer).
132. 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999).
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cant or employee.' Borrowing extensively from the D.C. Circuit's reasoning
in Aka, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit concluded that the ADA
requires employers to accommodate a qualified disabled employee through
placement of the disabled employee in a vacant position, even though a better
qualified applicant or employee also is available and interested in that posi-
tion.
134
Robert Smith developed muscular injuries and chronic dermatitis as a
result of seven years of exposure to chemicals and solvents while working in
the defendant's light assembly department. 35 The defendant terminated Smith
because his disability rendered him unfit to work in his regular position and
his work restrictions disqualified him from any other position in his depart-
ment."36 Smith filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Kansas, but the court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment
on all claims.' 31 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit initially affirmed
the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, but
then agreed to rehear Smith's ADA claim en bane for the purpose of interpret-
ing the scope of the ADA's reassignment accommodation.
31
After rejecting the logic of the vacated panel decision and joining the
majority of courts in holding that an employee is eligible for reassignment so
long as the employee is "qualified" for the vacant position, 3 9 the court spent
the rest of its opinion defining the scope of the reassignment duty under the
ADA. 40 The court agreed with the D.C. Circuit inAka that both the statutory
133. See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1164 (10th Cir. 1999) (en bane)
(concluding that ADA requires employers to place qualified disabled employee in vacant posi-
tion notwithstanding availability of better qualified non-disabled employees and applicants).
134. Id.




139. Id. at 1160-64. Midland Brake argued that Smith was not an otherwise "qualified
individual with a disability" because he could not perform the essential functions of his current
job in the light assembly department regardless of the accommodations provided for him. Id.
at 1161. The earlier panel decision had accepted this argument in affirming summary judgment
for the employer. See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 158 F.3d 1304, 1313 (10th Cir. 1998)
(providing opinion of earlier panel affirming summary judgment in favor of employer). The
great majority of cases now agree that whether a disabled individual qualifies for reassignment
is to be gauged, not with respect to his or her current position, but with respect to his or her
ability to perform the essential functions of the vacant position with or without reasonable
accommodation. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (citing to other court decisions
addressing this issue).
140. See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154,1164-80 (10th Cir. 1999) (defining
scope of ADA reassignment duty).
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text and legislative history of the ADA support the conclusion that reassign-
ment requires employers to do "something more" than merely allowing dis-
abled employees to compete equally with other job applicants.
141 The Smith
court, however, went beyond Aka to define more precisely what "something
more" entails when it stated that the "disabled employee has a right in fact to
the reassignment, and not just to the consideration process leading up to the
potential reassignment.""' To eliminate any doubt as to the majority's inter-
pretation of the statute, the opinion summarized an employer's reassignment
obligation as follows:
Theuivarishedobligationderivedfromthestatteisthis: anemployer
discriminates against a qualified individual witha disabilityifthe employer
failsto offerareasonableaccommodation Ifnoreasonableaccommodation
cankeep the employeeinhis or her existingjob, thenthereasonable accom-
modation may require reassignment to a vacant position so long as the
employee is qualified forthe job andit does notimpose anundueburdenon
the employer. Anything more, such as requiring the reassigned employee
to be the best qualified employee for the vacantjob, isjudicial gloss unwar-
ranted by the statutory language or its legislative history.' 0
In reaching its conclusion that the ADA requires employers to place
disabled employees in a vacant position despite the superior qualifications of
other applicants for the same position, the majority focused on the dissent's
contention that reassignment only requires that an employer afford "equal
consideration" to disabled employees in filling a vacant position.'" The
majority rejected this contention on several grounds. First, the majority noted
that the text of the ADA provides for "reassignment to a vacant position," a
duty not tempered by any limiting language.145 Second, from a practical
standpoint, requiring an employer merely to consider a disabled employee in
filling a vacancy amounts to little more than a "hollow promise" because:
The employer couldimerelygothroughthe meaninglessprocess ofconsider-
ation ofadisabled employee's applicationfor reassignment and refuse itin
every instance. It would be cold comfort for a disabled employee to know
that his or her application was "considered" butthat he or she was neverthe-
141. See id. at 1164 ("[ihe word 'reassign' must mean more than allowing an employee
to apply for ajob on the same basis as anyone else." (quoting Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d
1284, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en bane))).
142. Id. at 1166.
143. Id. at 1169.
144. Id. at 1181 (Kelly, 3., dissenting) ("So long as a person with a disability can perform
the essential functions of the vacant job with or without reasonable accommodation, that person,
like all others, should be afforded equal consideration without regard to disability, perceived
or otherwise.").
145. Id. at 1164.
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less still out ofajob -ajob to which he or she was otherwise qualified and
as to which he or she had a reasonable claim to reassignment 146
Finally, the majority pointed to the promulgation of the EEOC's recent En-
forcement Guidance and the ADA's legislative history as providing additional
support for its decision that reassignment means that a disabled employee has
a right in fact to the accommodation so long as the employee is qualified for
that position.
1 47
2. No Preference Required
The dissenting opinions in Aka and Smith are representative of the
opposing position in this debate. 48 The dissenters view the scope of the
reassignment accommodation as only requiring employers to allow disabled
employees to compete on an equal basis with other applicants in bidding for
vacant positions. An employer who provides such "equal consideration" to
disabled employees is deemed to have complied with the ADA's prohibition
against discrimination. 49 But, according to these dissents, any reading of the
ADA that would compel employers to provide any further assistance would
amount to a prohibited preference in favor of the disabled.'
The impact that the reassignment accommodation may have on the rights
of non-disabled employees particularly troubled Judge Silberman in his Aka
dissent.' 1 In reviewing the ADA authorized list of reasonable accommoda-
tions,"52 Judge Silberman found it significant that the other types of accommo-
146. Id. at 1167.
147. Id. at 1166-69.
148. See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1180-85 (10th Cir. 1999) (Kelly,
J., dissenting) (same); Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1306-12 (Henderson, J.,
dissenting) (stating that employers do not have duty to give hiring preferences to disabled
applicants); id. at 1312-15 (Silberman, I., dissenting) (same).
149. See Smith, 180 F3d at 1181 (Kelly, J., dissenting) ("So long as a person with a
disability can perform the essential functions of the vacant job with or without reasonable
accommodation, that person, like all others, should be afforded equal consideration without
regard to disability, perceived or otherwise.'); see also Aka, 156 F.3d at 1315 (Silberman, J.,
dissenting) ("If 'reassignment to a vacant position' is read in context, therefore, it must mean
that an employer is obligated ... to allow a disabled employee to compete (on equal terms with
non-disabled employees) for vacant positions.").
150. See Smith, 180 F.3d at 1185 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (noting that "a level playing field
is what Congress and the President envisioned when the ADA was enacted, not a preference");
Aka, 156 F.3d at 1311 (Henderson, J., dissenting) ("Congress made clear when the ADA was
enacted that employers were not expected or required to extend such preferences.").
151. See Aka, 156 F.3d at 1314-15 (Silberman, 3., dissenting) (exploring impact of ADA
reassignment accommodation on rights of non-disabled employees).
152. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (listing reasonable accommodations pro-
vided in ADA).
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dations focus solely on the relationship between the employer and disabled
employee and do not infiinge the rights of non-disabled employees. Ac-
cordingly, he concluded that Congress similarly did not intend to infringe the
rights of other employees by giving disabled employees a preference in
reassignment.
154
Two Illinois federal district court decisions recently have addressed this
issue and sided with the Aka and Smith dissenters. 155 Both courts concluded
that an employer faced with two applicants, one disabled and one better
qualified, does not violate the ADA when the employer chooses the more
qualified person for the job. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
recently has afrmed one of these decisions, thereby creating a clear circuit
split on this issue.'
5 6
a. Thompson v. Dot Foods, Inc.
In Thompson v. Dot Foods, Inc. ,'15 the plaintiff, an over-the-road truck
driver, injured his back in a non-work related accident.158 After spending time
on light duty to recover from his injury, Thompson returned to his full-time
position only to re-injure his lower back shortly thereafter.'59 While still
recuperating from this second injury, a physician recommended that Thomp-
son be placed in a more sedentary environment."6 Thompson applied for a
vacant dispatcher position and, according to the court, "performed well on the
153. See Aka, 156 F.3d at 1315 (Silberman, I., dissenting) ("In short, all of these sorts of
reasonable accommodation deal with the relationship between the disabled employee and the
employer, and have no direct impact on the situation of non-disabled employees or appli-
cants.").
154. See id. ("If the Congress had intended to grant a preference to the disabled - a rather
controversial notion - it would certainly not have done so by slipping the phrase 'reassignment
to a vacant position' in the middle of this list of reasonable accommodations.").
155. See EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 2d 798, 814-15 (N.D. Ill. 1999)
(construing scope of employer reassignment duty to consist merely of obligation to afford
equal treatment to disabled employees in filling vacant positions); Thompson v. Dot Foods, Inc.,
5 F. Supp. 2d 622, 628 (C.D. 11. 1998) (holding that employer satisfied ADA-imposed obli-
gations when employer considered disabled employee with other applicants for vacant position).
156. See EEOC v. Humistor-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024,1029 (7th Cir. 2000) (conclud-
ing that ADA does not require employer to reassign disabled employee to job for which there
is better applicant, provided that employer follows consistent and honest policy to hire best
applicant for particular job in question rather than first qualified applicant).
157. 5 F. Supp. 2d 622 (C.D. Ill. 1998).
158. See Thompson v. Dot Foods, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 622,628 (C.D. Ill. 1998) (holding
that employer satisfied ADA-imposed obligations when employer considered disabled employee
with other applicants for vacant position).
159. Id. at 623.
160. Id.
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tests given by Dot Foods to the dispatcher applicants."'6 1 The company,
however, hired one of the other thirty-one applicants for the position.162
Thompson sued, claiming that the employer violated the ADA when the
employer failed to reassign him to the vacant dispatcher position.'63 The
district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding
no evidence that the employer discriminated against the plaintiff when it
considered him for the dispatcher position" Agreeing with the dissent's
position in Smith, the court held that the employer satisfied its responsibilities
under the ADA when it "considered" Thompson along with the other appli-
cants for the vacant position.'" The court clearly signaled its view that the
reassignment accommodation duty imposes a non-discrimination obligation
rather than a preferential obligation in the following passage:
Inthe Court's opinion, the ADA did notrequire Dot Foods to give Thomp-
son its dispatcher position simply because he was disabled. Congress
enacted the ADA to eliminate discrimination against the disabled. 42
U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). DotFoods considered all ofthe applications, inter-
viewed some, andhiredtheperson whichitbelieved wasthe mostqualified
for the job and best met the company's needs, without regard to any appli-
cant's disability. Federal courts are not to be sitting as super-personnel
departments approving and disapproving everynewhire, promotion, trans-
fer, demotion, or termination."
Because Thompson was unable to show any evidence that Dot Foods discrimi-
nated against him in the application process for the dispatcher position, the
court ruled that the employer had satisfied its reasonable accommodation duty
under the ADA. 67
b. EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc.
InEEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc.," another federal district court sim-
ilarly construed the scope of an employer's reassignment duty as consisting
only of an obligation to afford equal treatment to disabled employees in filling




164. Id. at 627-28.
165. Id. at 628.
166. See id. at 627 (citing Kariotis v. Navistar Iat'l Transp. Corp., 131 F.3d 672, 678 (7th
Cir. 1997)).
167. Id. at 627-28.
168. 54 F. Supp. 2d 798 (ND. IM. 1999).
169. See EEOC v. Humiston-Keding, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 2d 798, 814-15 (ND. 11. 1999)
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a warehouse position that required employees to pick health and pharmaceuti-
cal products off ofan assembly line."' She subsequently injured her right arm
and was diagnosed later with tennis elbow.' Despite her employer's numer-
ous accommodations, Houser became unable to perform the essential func-
tions ofthe picker position." 2 Houser then applied and interviewed for a total
of eight office jobs within the company, but in each case the employer se-
lected another employee to transfer into the position."'
Although the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit at that time had
not yet ruled on whether the ADA requires employers to reassign disabled
employees despite the superior qualifications of other applicants, the Seventh
Circuit decisions holding that the reassignment obligation does not require
employers to violate legitimate, non-discriminatory transfer and assignment
policies influenced the district courtY74  Following the Seventh Circuit's
position on these policies, the court concluded that an employer may choose
a better-qualified applicant over a disabled employee:
Given this indication from the Seventh Circuit [on employer policies], the
court can only rule that [the employer] was not required to place Houserin
the switchboard/receptionist position when it viewed another employee as
more qualified. This would require it to have given Houser priority in
reassignment over her more-qualified coworkers.... [lit seems that [the
employer's] hiring the most qualified employee for the job is permissible
as it resulted from a legitimate, nondiscriminatory policy."
Interestingly, the district court's treatment of the Humiston-Keeling case
may be more significant for the court's post-judgment rulings than for its
initial decision. After the district court granted summary judgment for the
employer, the EEOC moved the court to reconsider and to alter or amend the
judgment in light ofthe EEOC's Enforcement Guidance that the EEOC prom-
ulgated shortly before the court issued its opinion in the case.176 The EEOC
(construing scope of employer's ADA reassignment duties limited to providing equal trealment
to disabled employees in filling occupational vacancies).
170. Id. at 801.
171. Id. at 802.
172. Id. at 803-05.
173. Id. at 804-06.
174. See id. at 811-13 (analyzing relevant case law); see inflra notes 184-224 and accom-
panying text (discussing cases highlighting tension between reassignment duty and employer
transfer and assignment policies).
175. See Humiston-Keeling, 54 F. Supp. 2d at 813 (concluding employer conduct permissi-
ble under ADA when employer followed employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory policy in
hiring better-qualified applicant over disabled employee).
176. Id. at 815. The EEOC released its Enforcement Guidance, supra note 79, on March
1, 1999, but apparently the district court did not consider the EEOC's Enforcement Guidance
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argued that the court should reconsider its holding in light of this EEOC
regulatory pronouncement stating that employers must reassign disabled
employees to vacant positions for which they are minimally qualified despite
the superior qualifications of other applicants.177 Because the court's decision
was now in direct conflict with EEOC guidelines, the federal agency urged the
court to give deference to the EEOC and overrule its initial decision."78 The
court, however, denied the EEOC's motion, stating that the EEOC Enforce-
ment Guidance "does not trump... the Seventh Circuit's own indication that
the ADA is not a 'mandatory preference' statute.' 79
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in affirming the district
court's decision, concurred with the district court that it did "not agree with
the Commission's interpretation of the statutory provision on reassign-
ment."'8 0 Judge Posner, writing the opinion for the court, criticized the
EEOC's position as giving '"bonus points" to individuals with disabilities even
where an employee's disability puts him or her at no disadvantage in bidding
for an open position.'' Such a result, according to Judge Posner, would
constitute "affirmative action with a vengeance."''  Instead, the court ruled
that "the ADA does not require an employer to reassign a disabled employee
to a job for which there is a better applicant, provided it's the employer's
consistent and honest policy to hire the best applicant for the particular job in
question." 83  Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit's decision in Humiston-
Keeling is diametrically opposed to the position of the Tenth Circuit in its
Smith decision.
C. Non-Discriminatory Transfer andAssignment Policies
Similar issues arise when the reassignment of a disabled employee would
conflict with a well established, non-discriminatory employer policy. The
in the district court's March 29, 1999 opinion. See Humiston-Keeling, 54 F. Supp. 2d at 816
(following Seventh Circuit to conclude that ADA is not mandatory preference statute).
177. See Humision-Keeling, 54 F. Supp. 2d at 816 ("The new EEOC Guidance states that
'the employee does not need to be the best qualified individual for the position in order to
obtain it as a reassignment'").
178. Id.
179. Id; see supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text (discussing EEOC deference).
Although it is unclear from the court's memorandum, it is possible that the Supreme Court's
decision inSution v. UnitedAirLines, Inc., in which the Supreme Court declined to defer to the
EEOC's Interpretive Guidance, influenced the district court
180. See EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024,1027 (7th Cir. 2000) (express-
ing disagreement with EEOC's interpretation ofADA reassignment provisions).
181. Id
182. Id. at 1029.
183. Id.
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type of policy at issue here generally concerns an employer's protocol for
filling vacant positions. Examples of such transfer and assignment policies
are those that use either competitive bidding or seniority as a preferential
mechanism for selecting a position's new occupant. On the one hand, inter-
preting the ADA as requiring employers to make exceptions to such policies
and to treat disabled employees differently than non-disabled employees
resembles a preference in favor of the disabled and cuts against the equal
treatment model reflected in most anti-discrimination statutes. On the other
hand, the text, history, and purpose of the ADA suggest that preferential
treatment for the disabled may not only be appropriate, but required.
1. Disabled Employee Prevails
Several courts have held that certain employer policies cannot justify an
employer's refusal to reassign an otherwise qualified disabled employee to a
vacant position. For example, in Davoll v. Webb,"84 the Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit held that a municipal employer's no-transfer policy must
give way to the ADA's reassignment obligation.'85 In Davoll, several police
officers were forced into retirement after disabling conditions rendered them
unable to perform their current jobs and a city-wide policy against employee
transfers precluded their placement into other vacant positions.'5 6 The appeals
court affirmed a jury verdict in favor of the officers and, relying heavily on its
holding in Smith, ruled that a "disabled employee has a right in fact to the
reassignment, and not just to the consideration process leading up to the
potential reassignment."'" Thus, because the city failed to reassign the plain-
tiffs, the court found the city's conduct to be discriminatory under the ADA
irrespective of an otherwise valid no-transfer policy.'88
The Tenth Circuit also affirmed the trial court's grant of plaintiffs'
motion in limine prohibiting the defendant from using terms such as "affirma-
tive action," "special rights," and "preferences" in addressing the jury. 89 The
court charged the defendant with "erroneously conflat[ing] 'affirmative
184. 194 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 1999).
185. See Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116, 1131-32 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that ADA's
reassignment obligation trumps municipal employer's no-tranfer policies).
186. See id. at 1125 (discussing Denver's policies on reassignment). The policy prevented
employees in the Classified System from transferring into the Career Service system and vice
versa even though the two systems were both merit-based and city-operated. Id.
187. Id. at 1132 (quoting Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1166 (10th Cir.
1999)).
188. See Davoll, 194 F.3d at 1132 (recognizing that failure to reassign disabled employees
may constitute discrimination and provide basis for liability under ADA).
189. Id. at 1136.
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action' with the statutory definition of discrimination."" 9 The court noted that
Congress, in enacting the ADA, expressly included reassignment to a vacant
position in its listing of reasonable accommodations and specified that the
type of discriminatory conduct banned under the statute included an em-
ployer's failure to reasonably accommodate the known physical and mental
impairments of disabled individuals.19 1 Therefore, "plaintiffs' request for
reassignment [was] a reasonable accommodation, not 'affirmative action,"'
and the defendant's use of the term "provides a conclusory (and politically
loaded) description of a requested accommodation."'93
On the flip side of no-transfer policies are policies that permit transfers,
but require that all employees compete equally for a position. In Ransom v.
Arizona Board ofRegents,194 the federal district court of Arizona struck down
such an employer policy. 9 Eileen Ransom worked for the University of
Arizona as an administrative assistant in the College of Nursing.1 96 'When
Ransom's carpal tunnel and myofascial pain syndrome worsened to the point
where she was unable to perform her word processing duties, she requested
a reassignment to a position with lighter word processing demands."9 This
request, however, ran afoul of a policy requiring that "all employees, includ-
ing those with disabilities, must compete for job reassignments through the
competitive hiring process."1" Ransom was unable to secure another position
through this process, and the university terminated her employment."'
The court held, as a matter of law, that the defendant's competitive
reassignment policy violated the ADA.2" The court rejected the university's
contention that disabled employees are entitled to reassignment "only in the
same way as an employer provides for reassignment of nondisabled employ-
ees.i2 °  Instead, the court found that the defendant's competitive transfer
190. Id. at 1137 (quoting Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F3d 1154, 1167 (10th Cir.
1999)).
191. See Davoll, 194 F.3d 1116, 1137 (10th Cir. 1999) (examining legislative history of.
ADA).
192. Id.
193. Id. at1137 n.14.
194. 983 F. Supp. 895, 899 (D. Ariz. 1997).
195. See Ransom v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 983 F. Supp. 895, 899 (D. Ariz. 1997) (holding
employer policy requiring qualified disabled employee seeking accommodation through reassign-





200. See id. at 899 (holding employer competitive reassignment violates ADA).
201. Id. at902.
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policy effectively "prevents" the reassignment of disabled employees and,
therefore, "discriminates against 'qualified individuals with disabilities."' '2
The Ransom court also rejected the university's affirmative action argu-
ment, observing that the undue hardship defense provides employers with ade-
quate means to challenge particularly burdensome reassignment requests. 3
Looking at that defense in the context of the case, the court stated:
Defendants have not explained, andthe Court cannot imagine, howthe
reassignment of two or three disabled employees every couple of years to
positions they are qualified to fill would cause the University to completely
modify its personnel system's competitive hiring policy. In short, the
Defendants offer no evidence... that accommodating such individuals [by
reassignment] would cause it an undue hardship.2 4
2. No Preference Required
Other courts have held that the ADA's reassignment accommodation
does not require employers to ignore, amend, or make exception to their
legitimate, non-discriminatory transfer and assignment policies. The decision
ofthe Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Daugherty v. City ofEl Paso
205
is representative of this position.2' Daugherty involved a city charter that
established priorities in filling vacant positions within the city's civil service
system.'0 7 Carl Daugherty worked as a part-time city bus driver until he was
diagnosed with insulin-dependent diabetes. 08 Because the diabetes rendered
him unable to perform his job, Daugherty sought reassignment to another
position °.2 ' Although the city charter governing reassignments gave him
preference for his disability, Daugherty was unable to secure another position
becauise that same policy gave full-time employees priority over part-time
workers.210 The city defended its policy on the ground that giving Daugherty,
a part-time employee, a full-time job would elicit complaints from other full-
time employees who had been waiting for that position and had more seniority
than Daugherty.211 The court agreed, concluding that the city was not required
202. Id. at 903.
203. See id. at 901-03 (noting availability of undue hardship defense).
204. Id. at 903.
205. 56 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 1995).
206. See Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding ADA
does not require employers to give disabled persons priority over non-disabled persons in hiring
and reassignment employment decisions).
207. Id. at 699.
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to make an exception for Daugherty under the policy. 2 The court further
explained:
[W]e do not read the ADA as requiring affirmative action in favor of
individuals withdisabilities, inthe sense ofrequiring that disabled persons
be givenpriorityinhiring orreassignmentoverthosewho are not disabled.
It prohlbits employment discrimination against qualified individuals with
disabilities, no more and no less."
Since Daugherty, numerous courts have adopted the Fifth Circuit's equal
treatment model in interpreting the reassignment accommodation and have
sustained non-discriminatory employer policies. For example, in Duckett v.
Dunlop Tire Corp.,214 the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that
the ADA does not require an employer to violate its "no roll back" policy,
which prohibited employees from transferring from salaried positions to
production positions within the bargaining unit.215 Similarly, in Barnett v.
US. Air, Inc.,216 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an
employer did not have to make an exception to its decades-old seniority policy
in order to reassign a disabled employee. 7 The Barnett court concluded that
requiring employers to make exceptions to legitimate, non-discriminatory
practices is tantamount to affirmative action in favor of the disabled.2"8
212. See id. at 700 (concluding that plaintiff failed to show any discrimination based on
plaintiff's disability).
213. Id. Many other court decisions agree with this viewpoint and have quoted this
language fromDaugherty favorably. See, e.g., Malabarba v. Chicago Tribune Co., 149 F3d 690,
700 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Daugherty and stating, "Congress enacted the ADA to establish a
'level playing field' for our nation's disabled workers .... it did not do so in the name of discrimi-
nating against persons free from disability"); Wemick v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 91 F3d 379,384-85
(2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Daugherty and stating, "Congress intended simply that disabled persons
have the same opportunities available to them as are available to nondisabled persons").
214. 120 F.3d 1222 (1lth Cir. 1997).
215. SeeDuckettv. Dunlop Tire Corp., 120 F.3d 1222,1225 (llth Cir. 1997) (holdingthat
ADA does not require employer to transfer employee from salaried position into production
position against employer's business policy).
216. 196 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 1999).
217. SeeBamettv.U.S.Air, Inc., 196 F3d 979,991 (9th Cir. 1999) (concludingthatADA
requires "no more than equality among disabled and nondisabled employees in hiring and
reassignment decisions), vacated by 201 F3d 1256 (9th Cir. 2000) (scheduling rehearing en
bane).
218. SeeBarnett, 196 F.3d at 991 (concludingthatrequirementto force employerstomake
exceptions to legitimate, non-discriminatory employment practices in favor of disabled employ-
ees would be functionally equivalent to affirmative action program). Numerous courts have
found that an employer does not have to violate a seniority provision in a collective bargaining
agreement in order to reassign a disabled employee. See supra note 63 and accompanying text
(explaining that majority of courts have adopted rule that employers are not required to violate
applicable seniority provision of collective bargaining agreement in order to comply with ADA's
reassignment accommodation). The Barnett decision extends this principle to seniority policies
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The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu
Automotive, Inc.,219 has provided the most extensive discussion of the tension
between reassignment and employer policies.' ° In that case, the Seventh Cir-
cuit rejected the plaintiffs' request thatthey receive permanent positions within
the employer's established temporary job placement program for employees
with temporary disabilities. 2' The court, after reviewing the statute and
existing case law, concluded that the ADA does not compel an employer "to
abandon its legitimate, nondiscriminatory company policies definingjob quali-
fications, prerequisites, and entitlements to intra-company transfers. "I The
court expressed the belief that "the contrary rule would convert a nondiscrimi-
nation statute into a mandatory preference statute, a result which would be both
inconsistent with the nondiscriminatory aims ofthe ADA and an unreasonable
imposition on the employers and coworkers of disabled employees."'  The
Seventh Circuit cautioned, however, that an employer's blanket "no transfer"
policy might have to give wayto the ADA's reassignment duty if such a policy
unduly restricted the range ofjobs available for reassignment. 4
IV Reassignment to a Vacant Position: Reasonable Accommodation
or Affirmative Action?
A. The Growing Discomfort with Affirmative Action
The debate over affirmative action, at least in the context of race and
gender, has been long and sustained.' Judicial and political receptiveness to
that the employer unilaterally establishes without the benefit of collective negotiations. See
Barnett, 196 F.3d at 990-91 (concluding ADA reassignment provision does not require employer
to make exception to employer's established seniority policy to favor disabled employee); see
also Foreman v. Babcock Wilcox Co., 117 F-3d 800,810 (5th Cir. 1997) (agreeing in dicta).
219. 141 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 1998).
220. See Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Auto., Inc., 141 F.3d 667,679 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding
that ADA does not require employer to abandon legitimate non-discriminatory company
policies defining job qualifications).
221. See id. at 680 (rejecting plaintiffs' request for permanent reassignment to employer's
program for employees with temporary disabilities).
222. Id. at 678. The Seventh Circuit later reaffirmed this holding, stating that an employer
is not required to make exceptions to a consistently applied policy of hiring the best applicant
for the job. See EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1029 (7th Cir. 2000) (con-
cluding that ADA does not require employer to reassign disabled employee to job for which
there is better applicant where employer has consistent and honest policy to hire best applicant).
223. Dalton, 141 F.3d at 679.
224. See id. (finding that employer blanket no transfer may remain susceptible to challenge
under ADA).
225. See Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21
BERKEL.EYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 19,44 (2000) (stating that "afflirmative action has been controver-
sial at every turn"); Daniel A. Farber, The Outmoded Debate Over AffirmativeAction, 82 CAL.
L. REV. 893 (1994) (summarizing and critiquing ongoing affirmative action debate), Mark C.
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affirmative action programs has decreased substantially during the last quarter-
century to the point where such programs are permitted, if at all, in only the
narrowest of circumstances.' In its first affirmative action case, Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke,7 the Supreme Court recognized the
validity of affirmative action programs, provided that such programs did not
use quotas and were justified through either a remedial or diversity rationale."
Since Bakke, one major lower court decision has rejected the diversity ratio-
nale,' and the Supreme Court has drawn it into serious question."0 Today,
federal, state, and local govermnent affirmative action programs are subject to
Weber, Beyond the Americans with Disabilities Act: A National Employment Policy for
People with Disabilities, 46 BUFF. L. REv. 123, 145 (1998) ("Affirmative action on the basis
of race has been the subject of immense controversy.").
226. Compare Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616,642 (1987) (holding that appel-
lee appropriately considered female employee's gender as one factor in promotion determina-
tion and that appellee's consideration of employee's gender was consistent with Title VII),
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979) (holding that Title VI's prohibition
against racial discrimination does not condemn all private, voluntary, race-conscious affirma-
tive action plans), and Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978)
(holding Title VII proscribes only those racial classifications that would violate Equal Prote-
ction Clause or Eighth Amendment), with Adamnd Constructors, Inc. v. Pens, 515 U.S. 200,
204 (1995) (holding both state and federal racial classifications subject to strict scrutiny and
must serve compelling governmental interest and be narrowly tailored to further that interest),
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511 (1989) (concluding appellant's plan
requiring general contractors awarded municipal construction projects to subcontract thirty
percent of dollar amount of contracts to minority-owned businesses was not narrowly tailored
to serve compelling governmental interest), Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir.
1996) (holding that appllee law school's admission policy giving "substantial racial prefer-
ences" to minority students violated Equal Protection Clause), cert denied, 518 U.S. 1033
(1996), and Taxman v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1550 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding non-
remedial affirmative action plan intended to promote "racial diversity" violated Title VII),
vacated as moot, 522 U.S. 1010 (1997).
227. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
228. See Regents of the Univ. of CaL v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (holding Title
VII proscribes only those racial classifications that would constitute violation of Equal Protec-
tion Clause or EighthAmendment).
229. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (Sth Cir. 1996) (holding that diversity is not
sufficiently compelling governmental interest to withstand strict scrutiny review), cert denied,
518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
230. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pens, 515 U.S. 200, 221 (1995) ("The Court's
failure in Bakke to produce a majority opinion... left unresolved the proper analysis for
remedial, race-based government action"); id. at 241 (Thomas, J., concuring) ("In my mind,
govemment-sponsored racial discrimination based on benign prejudice is just as noxious as
discrimination inspired by malicious prejudice"); City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 493 (1989) (noting that "unless [racial classifications] are strictly reserved for remedial
settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial
hostility").
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strict scrutiny review, requiring the government to demonstrate a compelling
governmental interest that is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.2 1
The Supreme Court, in United Steelworkers v. Weber 2 and Johnson v.
Transportation Agency,1 3 has been somewhat more receptive to affirnative
action programs in private employment, holding that voluntary affirmative
action programs are valid if they meet three criteria: (1) the plan is designed
to break a historic pattern of under-representation in traditionally segregated
occupations; (2) the plan does not unnecessarily trammel the interests of white
employees; and (3) the plan is temporary in duration and designed to eliminate
a manifest racial imbalance in the workforce.' Even here, however, courts
have refused to expand the scope of such programs beyond the narrow limits
defined in the Supreme Court's early decisions. 5
In addition to the heightened judicial scrutiny of affirmative action
programs, the political and academic support for affirmative action has all but
vanished. 6 Academic scholars question its legitimacy, and states like Cali-
fornia have garnered enough public support to pass Proposition 209 abolishing
affirmative action? The combined effect of such responses compels the
231. See Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 204 (addressing federal affirmative action
programs); JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 511 (addressing state affirmative action programs).
232. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
233. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
234. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 628-30 (1987) (providing criteria
necessary to validate voluntary affirmative action program); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193, 208-09 (1979) (outlining criteria validating defendant's affirmative action program);
see also Barbara J. Fick, The Case for Maintaining and Encouraging the Use of Voluntary
Affirmative Action in Private Sector Employment, 11 NoTEE DAwE J.L. EThics & PUB. POL'Y
159 (1997) (summarizing legal framework for testing validity ofprivate sector affirmative action
programs).
235. See, e.g., Taxrman v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F3d 1547, 1565 (3d Cir. 1996) (rejecting
school board's affirmative action plan designed to increase cultural diversity).
236. See Michelle Adams, The Last Wave ofAffirmative Action, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 1395,
1463 ("Affirmative action programs have been under siege from every angle in recent years.");
Levitsky, supra note 13, at 88 (noting that "[olverall, there is little White support for affirmative
action in any of its forms"); Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action:
Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REv. 953, 953 (1996) (describing "a broad-based
assault on affirmative action - in the courts, the legislatures, and the media").
237. See, e.g., William Bradford Reynolds, An Experiment Gone Awry, in THE AFFRMA-
TIVE ACTION DEBATE 130 (George Curry ed., 1996) (arguing that affirmative action is inher-
ently discriminatory); Jim Chen, Diversi y in a DifferentDimension: Evolutionary Theory and
Affirmative Action's Destiny, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 811, 814 (1998) (questioning diversity rationale
as adequate means for supporting affirmative action programs in higher education).
238. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 110 F.3d 1431, 1446 (9th Cir. 1997)
(upholding validity of Proposition 209); see also Wash. Initiative Measure No. 200, WAsH.
REV. CODE § 49.60AO0 (2000) (passed by popular vote on November 3, 1998). Polling data
further suggests that a large majority of white Americans oppose affirmative action. See, e.g.,
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conclusion that, at least in the context of race, affirmative action, even where
voluntary, is standing on thin ice.
Around the same time that affirmative action was losing popularity,
Congress enacted the ADA "with considerable fanfare and support.3 9 Until
recently, most Americans viewed the ADA's reasonable accommodation
requirement with favor, even though this obligation is mandatory rather than
voluntary in nature. The reasonable accommodation mandate was viewed as
"non-problematic" because of its "perceived fairness."24 But as the federal
courts increasingly have used anti-affirmative action rhetoric in interpreting
the ADA,24 the question arises whether the generally negative reaction toward
affirmative action has fueled such attacks or whether a backlash specifically
against the ADA is underway.242 Whatever the reason, the recent conflict over
the scope of an employer's duty to reassign disabled employees raises two
significant questions: (1) Are reasonable accommodation, in general, and
reassignment, in particular, forms of affirmative action? (2) If so, are the
needs of disabled individuals sufficiently different from considerations of race
so as to justify these affirmative requirements?
B. Similarities Between Reasonable Accommodation and
Affirmative Action
Reasonable accommodation certainly is a form of affirmative action to
the extent that "[i]t requires employers to take certain steps, short of an undue
hardship, to assist disabled applicants and employees who otherwise fall short
Lawrence Bobo & Ryan Smith, Andpoverty Policy, Aff rmative Action, and RacialAttitudes,
in CONFRON3NG POVERTY: PRESCRIPTIONS FOR CHANGE 365, 381 (Sheldon HL Danzieger et
al. eds., 1994) (discussing polling data indicating that, in 1990, some 61.4% of surveyed whites
were "strongly against" affirmative action for blacks with another 21.1% simply "against" such
policies).
239. See Befort & Lindquist Thomas, supra note 31, at 27 (noting "considerable fanfare
and support" for ADA).
240. See Long, supra note 17, at 1344 (concluding that reasonable accommodation under
ADA is "non-problematic" because of its "perceived faime"); see also LAWRENCE & MAT-
SUDA, supra note 13, at 108 (noting American public's acceptance of affirmative action for
disabled employees despite significant costs imposed on employers to reasonably accommodate
disabled employees).
241. See supra Part ILB.2 and Part ILC.2 (discussing cases excusing employers from
reassigning disabled employees on grounds that ADA does not require preferential treatment
in favor of disabled employees).
242. See Diller, supra note 225, at 22 (suggesting that federal courts are currently engaged
in "some kind ofjudicial backlash against the ADA."); see also Ruth Colker, The Americans
with DisabilitiesAct A Windfallfor Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99,109 (1999)
(employing empirical analysis of decided court decisions to find that defendants prevail in
92.7% of aUlADA cases).
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of required job performance capabilities.n243 With this requirement, the ADA
goes beyond the equal treatment model of discrimination embodied in most
anti-discrimination statutes2" to further obligate employers to provide favor-
able workplace adjustments to the disabled regardless of whether those same
adjustments are provided to the non-disabled.24s The similarities between rea-
sonable accommodation and affirmative action are most acute whenthe accom-
modation in question is reassignment. For reassignment, as with affirmative
action, protected class status serves as a preferential basis for selecting some-
one to fill ajob position. Finally, the affirmative action and reasonable accom-
modation concepts also bear some similarity in terms of serving as a remedy
for past discrimination.
24
C. Differences Between Reasonable Accommodation and
Affirmative Action
Despite the similarities, reasonable accommodation under the ADA
differs significantly from affirmative action in other contexts such that using
the affirmative action analogy to justify an employer's failure to reassign a
qualified individual with a disability is misplaced. The text, practicalities, and
policies underlying the ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement
illustrate that reasonable accommodation should not be equated with tradi-
tional forms of affurmative action. 41
The first and most obvious difference between affirmative action in the
race and disability contexts flows from the language of the respective statutes
243. See Befort & Lindquist Thomas, supra note 31, at 75 (analyzing reasonable accom-
modation provision of ADA); see also Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 29, at 14 ("Reasonable
accommodation is affirmative action in the sense it requires an employer to take account of an
individual's disabilifies and to provide special treatment to him for that reason.").
244. See infra notes 248-55 and accompanying text (comparing ADA's discrimination
formula with equal treatment model of discrimination).
245. See Diller, supra note 225, at 43 (stating that affirmative action and reasonable
accommodation concepts both "rely on visions of equality that call for differential treatment of
the subordinated individual or group").
246. The ADA's mandate for employers to provide reasonable accommodations to the
known physical and mental impairments of qualified individuals with disabilities is one means
to remedy past discrimination toward the disabled, which, as discussed supra notes 231-35 and
accompanying text, is perhaps the only acceptable rationale left to justify traditional affirmative
action. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. RLrV. 899,
943-44 (1993) (viewing ADA's reasonable accommodation as means to remedy subconscious
and negligent discrimination).
247. See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 29 at 14 (observing that "a number of key
differences make reasonable accommodation under the ADA a distinct, and novel, form of
special treatment").
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themselves. Most anti-discrimination statutes embrace an equal treatment
model of discrimination.248 Title VII, for example, prohibits discrimination
"because of' certain listed characteristics such as an employee's race or
gender." This language, implementing an equal treatment approach to dis-
crimination, compels employers to make employment decisions without refer-
ence to the listed traits. Put another way, prohibited discrimination occurs
whenever an employer decides not to hire someone because of a specific trait,
or conversely, whenever an employer takes favorable account of a person's
race or gender in making an employment decision. Thus, except for those
narrowly tailored, voluntary affirmative action plans discussed above, most
employer efforts at affirmative action are prohibited under statutes containing
an equal treatment model of discrimination."0
The ADA uses a different formula in banning disability-based discrimi-
nation."s The ADA goes beyond the equal treatment model also to require
different treatment in the form of requiring employers to provide reasonable
accommodations to otherwise qualified individuals with a disability. 2 Under
this different treatment model, an employer who merely refrains from treating
disabled employees differently than non-disabled employees may be engaging
248. For a discussion of the equal treatment model of anti-discrimination statutes, see
generally Owen Fiss,A Theory ofFairEmploymentLaws, 38 U. CEL L. REV. 235,237 (1971)
(describing Title VIl's "norm of color blindness") and Paul Steven Miller,,Disabiify Ciil
Rights and a New Paradigm for the Twenty-First Century: The Expansion of Civil Rights
Beyond Race, Gender, andAge, I U. PA. . LAB. & EMP. L. 511, 515 (1998) (describing tradi-
tional civil rights paradigm as one requiring "equal playing field" for all workers).
249. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994). Title VII also protects against discrimination on the
basis of color, religion, or national origin. Id. The ADEA similarly bans discrimination
"because of' age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1994). For purposes of discussion, the authors have
chosen to make reference only to race and gender.
250. See supra notes 232-36 and accompanying text (discussing three-prong test for private
employment affirmative action programs).
251. See Befort & Lindquist Thomas, supra note 31, at 68-69 (paraphrasing ADA's more
complicated anti-discrimination formula). Befort and Lindquist Thomas stated:
No employer shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability of such individual who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position,
unless the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the
business of that employer, or unless such individual would pose a direct threat to
the health or safety of others.
Id.
252. For a discussion of how theADA adopts a different treatment model of anti-discrimi-
nation law, see generally Diller, supra note 225, at 40-44 (noting that "ADA relies on a different
treatment vision of equality") and Miller, supra note 248, at 514, 516-21 (describing new civil
rights paradigm as one that "recasts the notion of a 'level' playing field into one of an 'accessi-
ble' playing field").
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in prohibited discrimination.253 For example, an equal treatment approach
would sustain an employer policy prohibiting all dogs from the workplace.
Such a policy, however, would have an adverse effect on a blind person who
uses a guide dog. Treating the blind person differently by making an excep-
tion to the policy may be required in order to provide equal opportunity for
that person.' The concept of reasonable accommodation, accordingly, repre-
sents Congress's recognition that "in order to treat some persons equally, we
must treat them differently."'25 Therefore, as a purely statutory matter, Con-
gress's decision to define discrimination to include a failure to reasonably
accommodate justifies the affirmative action taken in favor of disabled indi-
viduals.
256
In addition to being statutorily authorized, the context in which reason-
able accommodation occurs under the ADA differs significantly from tradi-
tional affirmative action plans. Conventional affirmative action programs
consist of pre-designed policies through which employers seek to increase the
proportion of a historically under-represented minority group in its overall
workforce. 1 Employers typically establish target goals through a statistical
comparison of their workforce with the relevant labor market." Once a plan
is established, an employer implements the plan throughout its recruitment
and hiring processes until the numerical goals for the under-represented group
are met.
In contrast, reasonable accommodation under the ADA occurs on a much
more individualized basis."9 The reasonable accommodationprocess does not
involve the setting of pre-determined numerical goals or quotas. Rather,
253. See Weber, supra note 225, at 146 ("[I]t is impossible to deny that for disability, if
for no other characteristic, perfectly equal treatment can constitute discrimination.").
254. See Miller, supra note 248, at 514 ("For disabled people -who need reasonable
accommodations in order to perform the essential functions of their jobs, 'equal' treatment is
tantamount to a barrier to employment, not a gateway.").
255. See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 29, at 10 (exploring concept of reasonable
accommodation).
256. See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154,1164 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that
"although the dissent would prefer to view the reasonable accommodation of reassignment as
'affirmative action,' Congress chose to consider it otherwise when it defined the failure
reasonably to accommodate (including reassignment) as a prohibited act of discrimination. It
is the Congressional definition, of course, that must govern our analysis."); Colker, supra note
18, at 225 (criticizing courts for disingenuously "construing the ADA to erase the reassign-
ment/reasonable accommodation rule" in name of avoiding affirmative action).
257. See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 29, at 17 (describing conventional affirmative
action plans).
258. Id.




reasonable accommodation, and thus the ADA's version of affirmative action,
occurs only after the employer and disabled applicant or employee have
engaged in an interactive process. This process is intended to identify both
the essential functions of the position in question and the special needs of the
disabled person. 6 Thus, the consideration ofthe individual's protected class
status is not made in the shadows of the recruiting committee, as is the case
with traditional affirmative action programs. The ADA's reasonable accom-
modation process, instead, requires an open dialogue between the parties in
a mutual search for workable options.26' This dialogue, moreover, does not
guarantee an accommodation in favor of a disabled worker. Employers are
required to accommodate the physical and mental impairnents of an individ-
ual with a disability only if the individual is ultimately capable of performing
the essential functions ofthe job26' and the employer who provides the accom-
modation does not suffer an undue hardship.2 '
These differences also impact the frequency with which reasonable
accommodations in favor ofthe disabled occur. This is particularly tine when
reassignment is at issue. The EEOC suggests that reassignment should be the
accommodation of last resort, one that the employer should consider "only
when accommodation within the individual's current position would pose an
undue hardship."2" The inapplicability of reassignment at the hiring stage,
the point at which conventional affirmative action programs is most pervasive,
further diminishes the frequency of reassignment.6 5
The inapplicability of reassignment at the application stage underscores
another significant distinction when compared to traditional affirmative action
programs. Reassignment operates only as a post-hire mechanism through
which an employer may retain the services of a current employee with a dis-
ability. No other employee loses employment as a result of this job transfer.
Affirmative action, in contrast, operates as a pre-hire formula that reserves
employment opportunities for one group of applicants at the expense of
another group of applicants.
Finally, from a policy standpoint, the "perceived fairness" of reasonably
accommodating the known impairments of disabled individuals simply may be
260. See C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(oX3) (1999) (stating that determination of appropriate
reasonable accommodation requires employer to engage in "informal, interactive process" with
qualified disabled individual).
261. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text (discussing EEOC recommended inter-
active process).
262. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994) (defining "qualified individual with a disability").
263. See id. § 12111(10) (defining "undue hardship").
264. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) (1999).
265. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text (stating that reassignment is available
to employees, not applicants).
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greater than in other affirmative action contexts.2's While consideration of a
person's race and gender is inappropriate because neither characteristic bears
any inherent relationship to an individual's abilities, consideration of a per-
son's disability may be required because the individual's impairment often is
directly related to the individual's ability to perform the job.267 Reasonable
accommodation thus ensures that disabled persons are not deprived of job
opportunities to which they otherwise might not have access under a disability-
blind statute. In other words, "[o]nce the need for different treatment is recog-
nized, affirmative action for persons with disabilities emerges as one of many
forms of different treatment that might be needed to achieve equality."2
Therefore, although similarities can be drawn between affirmative action
and reasonable accommodation, significant differences justify keeping the two
concepts separate. In the final analysis, it is best to determine the validity of
reasonable accommodation on its own merits without the considerable bag-
gage of the affirmative action debate.
V Drawing Workable Boundaries for Reassigning Individuals
with Disabilities
The affirmative action debate aside, some attempt to clarify the judicial
dissonance in the federal courts is necessary ifthe ADA is to achieve the goals
Congress intended. Predictability, rather than confusion, best charts that
course. This Part of the Article attenps to draw policy-based boundaries for
resolving the two difficult issues currently burdening the reassignment accom-
modation.
266. See Long, supra note 17, at 1344 (concluding that "disability-based affirmative action
is viewed as non-problematio... [because of] the perceived fairness of the reasonable accom-
modation requirement"). But see LAWREN CE & MATSUDA, supra note 13, at 108 ("How is it that
the American public could accept affirmative action for the disabled, even given the significant
expenditures that reasonable accommodation requires, but could not accept affirmative action
for those burdened with racial discrimination? The answer racism.").
267. See Diller, supra note 225, at 40 (observing that "unlike race, disability is frequently
a legitimate consideration in employment decisions").
268. See Weber, supra note 225, at 146 (discussing affirmative action in ADA context);
see also Ransom v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 983 F. Supp. 895, 901 (D. Ariz. 1997) (stating that
ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement serves "as a method of leveling the playing field
between disabled and non-disabled employees, in the sense of enabling a disabled worker to do
the job without creating undue hardship on the employer"); Diler, supra note 225, at 41 (stating
that "the reasonable accommodation requirement is not a means of giving people with disabili-
ties a special benefit or advantage, rather, it is a means of equalizing the playing field so that
people with disabilities are not disadvantaged by the fact that the workplace ignores their
needs"); R- George Wright, Persons with Disabilities and the Meaning of Constitutional Equal
Protection, 60 Oiuo ST. L.J 145, 162-73 (1999) (arguing that equality for individuals with
severe disabilities requires treatment that takes these disabilities into account).
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A. Disabled Employee vs. Better-QualifiedAlternative Worker
An employer may be faced with the dilemma of filling a vacancy with a
disabled individual or a more qualified individual in either of two situations:
(1) a qualified employee with a disability and a better-qualified applicant who
is not a current employee both desire to fill a vacant position, or (2) a quali-
fied employee with a disability and a better-qualified co-employee both desire
to transfer into a vacant position. Each of these contexts will be discussed
below.269
1. Qualified Employee with a Disability vs. Better-QualifiedApplicant
When the applicants for a vacant position include an employee who has
become unable to perform his or her current job as a result of a disability and
an applicant, who, althoughpossessing superior qualifications forthe position,
has not worked previously for the employer, the ADA should be interpreted
to require the employer to place the disabled employee in that vacant position
so long as he or she is qualified for that position. Important policy consider-
ations support this conclusion. First and foremost is the ADA's central
purpose of helping disabled individuals to participate fully in the American
workplace.Y° In enacting the ADA, Congress explicitly articulated the stat-
ute's goals to include assuring "equality of opportunity, full participation,
independent living, and economic self-sufficiency" for individuals with
disabilitiesY The ADA's legislative history further instructs employers that,
when ficed with the choice of terminating or retaining a disabled employee,
an employer should choose the latter option:
If an employee, because of disability, can no longer perform the essential
functions of the job that she or he has held, a transfer to anothervacant job
for which the person is qualified maypreventthe employee from being out
of work and [the] employer from losing a valuable worker.2'
In addition to effectuating the purposes of the ADA, significant practical
advantages also support preferring a disabled employee over a non-disabled
applicant. For instance, placing the disabled employee in the vacant position
269. The dilemma of selecting between a disabled applicant and a better-qualified alter-
native worker does not occur at the hiring stage because, as previously mentioned, reassignment
is not required for disabled applicants. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text (stating
that reassignment is available for employees, not applicants).
270. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (1994) (addressing purpose and goals of ADA); see also
supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text (discussing principal motivation of Congress for enact-
ing ADA).
271. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(aX8) (1994).
272. H.R. REP. No.485 (11), at 63 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.S.CAN. 303,345.
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allows the employer to retain someone who is familiar with the intricacies and
policies of the employer's businessY3 The employer also gains in tens of
boosting the morale and productivity of other workers because the employer's
action demonstrates that the employer values their work and continued em-
ployment.
274
Finally, the ADA recognizes the principle, also acknowledged in many
other labor and employment law contexts, that a current employee has a
weightier interest in retaining employment than does an applicant in securing
a job not currently held.7" Thus, the ADA provides that employers may
require pre-employment medical examinations for all applicants who have
received a conditional job offer for a position."6 However, an employer may
require such an examination in a post-hire setting only if the conduct of the
examination "is shown to be job-related and consistent with business neces-
sity."2" Similarly, and closer to the matter at issue, only current employees
have a right to request reassignment to another position as a reasonable
accommodation."5 Applying that same logic to the issue at hand, the interest
of a disabled employee in retaining employment through means of reassign-
ment generally should trump the interest of an applicant, even a better-quali-
fled one, in seeking to obtain a job not currently held.
2. Qualifed Employee with a Disability vs. Better-Qualified Employee
Many of the reasons noted in the prior section for favoring the reassign-
ment claim of a disabled employee disappear when the competing worker is
a fellow current employee. Nevertheless, the general rule inthis situation also
should require that the employer place a qualified disabled employee in the
vacant position. Otherwise, the ADA's central purpose of enabling individ-
273. See Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("A willingness to accommo-
date incumbent employees increases the likelihood that they - and their knowhow - will be
retained by the employing agency.").
274. See id. (noting that retention of incumbent employee increases employee morale and
productivity).
275. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1972) (distinguishing
between employee's property interest in continued employment based upon terms of contractual
arrangement, as opposed to unilateral expectation of being rehired after expiration of contract
term); Loder v. City of Glendale, 927 P.2d 1200, 1222-26 (Cal. 1997) (recognizing that
employer has greater constitutional leeway to require job applicants to submit to mandatory
drug test than employer does for current employees).
276. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(dX3) (1994) (addressing employment entrance examina-
tions).
277. Id. § 12112(dX4XA).
278. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) (1999) (stating that "reassignment is not available to
applicants").
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uals with disabilities to remain in "the economic and social mainstream of
American life" would be defeated.279
To demonstrate how the ADA's purpose would be curtailed in the
absence of such a rule, consider the fate of each employee if he or she does
not obtain the vacant position. If the disabled employee is denied the re-
quested transfer, the disabled employee is out of a job. Under the ADA's
reasonable accommodation scheme, an employer's duty to reassign arises only
if a disabled employee cannot be accommodated in the disabled employee's
current position.O Because reassignment is the accommodation of last resort,
the opportunity to be placed in this vacant position represents the disabled
employee's "last chance" to remain employed with that particular employer."s
In contrast, the consequences suffered by a more qualified employee who
does not obtain the desired transfer are less severe. That employee can still
remain in the employee's current position. The non-disabled employee's excel-
lent qualifications, moreover, make the non-disabled employee a strong
candidate for a future transfer or promotion. In short, the non-disabled worker
remains employed and opportunities to move into more desirable positions are
deferred rather than lost. Given this significant disparity in consequences, as
well as the purpose of helping disabled persons remain in the workplace, the
scale generally should tip in favor of the disabled employee.
From the employer's standpoint, although the employer is not hiring the
"most qualified" person for the position, the employer nonetheless gains in
several other respects. First, the employer complies with the ADA's statutory
mandate to reasonably accommodate the known physical or mental disabilities
of individual employees, thus avoiding a violation of the ADA and any
potential lawsuits that may result.' In contrast, the non-disabled employee
cannot sue the employer because, unlike other non-discrimination statutes
such as Title VII, a non-disabled individual has no standing under the ADA. 3
Second, because the employer likely will succeed in placing the other well-
qualified employee in the next similar vacant position, the employer only
suffers a delay in benefitting from the employee's qualifications. Third, the
279. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 20 (1989) (discussing central purpose ofADA).
280. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) (1999) (noting that, in general, reassignment should
be considered "only when accommodation within individual's current position would pose
undue hardship").
281. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (recognizing reassignment as reasonable
accommodation of last resort).
282. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(bX5XA) (1994) (defining discrimination to include "not
making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or an employee").
283. See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 29, at 21 (noting how reverse discrimination
lawsuits are not available under ADA).
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limitations on reassignment recognized in the EEOC guidelines minimize the
number of occasions in which this situation will present itself. 4 As the
District Court of Arizona aptly stated: "[The Court cannot imagine, how the
reassignment of two or three disabled employees every couple of years to
positions they are qualified to fill" would result in a significant hardship for
most employers.2
5
Finally, the undue hardship defense provides an adequate escape valve
for employers who are able to demonstrate that their business operations will
suffer if they cannot place better-qualified employees into desired positions.
Under the ADA, an employer is relieved of its duty to reasonably accommo-
date the known disabilities of an individual if it can demonstrate that doing so
would require "significant difficulty or expense." 6 Whether a particular
reasonable accommodation amounts to an undue hardship is considered in
light of several factors listed in the statute.' Among these factors is a consid-
eration of "the impact... of such accommodation upon the operation of the
facility.128 8 According to the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance, an employer
need not undertake "any accommodation that would be unduly costly, exten-
sive, substantial, or disruptive, or that would fundamentally alter the nature
or operation of the business." '  Therefore, in circumstances in which the
better-qualified employee's skills are vital to the successful performance of
the essential functions of the position in question, an employer may be able
to demonstrate that not filling the vacancy with this employee would amount
to an undue hardship.
The undue hardship defense represents Congress's attempt to balance the
legitimate business interests of employers with the legitimate needs of the
disabled. The undue hardship calculus is a more desirable means for testing
an employer's decision to place a better-qualified person in a vacant position
than the adoption of a contrary approach that would severely curtail the
transfer rights of the disabled. Although the latter solution would avoid the
"politically loaded" label of affirmative action, it also would serve to elevate
an inapt rhetorical debate over the fundamental goals of the ADA.'
284. See supra notes 76-92 and accompanying text (discussing reassignment under EEOC
guidelines).
285. See Ransom v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 983 F. Supp. 895, 903 (D. Ariz. 1997) (analyz-
ing impact of reassignment under ADA).
286. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10XA) (1994).
287. Id. §12111(1O)(B);seesupranote4l(isingfactorsconsideredunder §12111(lO)(B)).
288. 42 U.S.C. §12111(10)(B) (1994).
289. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(p) (1999) (addressing scope of employer reassignment
duties).
290. See Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116, 1137 n.14 (10th Cir. 1999) (examining undue
hardship standard of employer reassignment obligations under ADA); see also Ransom, 983 F.
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B. Legitimate Non-Discriminatory Employer Policies
The Tenth Circuit's en bane decision in Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc. 1
provides a useful road map for resolving the issue of when employers must set
aside or make exception to their legitimate, non-discriminatory employer
policies.' In Smith, the court stated that employers should not be required
to abandon neutral transfer and assignment policies in order to reassign a
disabled employee, unless the policy in question would "essentially vitiate"
the employer's express statutory obligation under the ADA to reassign quali-
fying employees as a form of reasonable accommodation.' Using reason-
ableness as the touchstone for determining the issue of employer policies, the
Smith court noted that requiring employers to make exception to a long
established policy would in many instances "constitute a fundamental and
unreasonable alteration in the nature of the employer's business."'  Other-
wise stated, if the policy is "fundamental to the way an employer does busi-
ness," the employer is not required to violate the policy in order to reassign a
disabled individual.2 5
This general rule makes sense in several respects. First, it is consistent
with the majority approach taken on the issue of whether a seniority provi-
sion in a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) should trump the ADA's
reassignment accommodation.' Most courts have now adopted a bright line
rule that employers are not required to violate a CBA provision in order to
reassign a disabled individual under the ADA. In balancing the interests
of the concerned parties, which include the employer, the disabled employee,
and other CBA-covered employees, most courts have decided that when the
ADA conflicts with an applicable CBA, the greater right to the position be-
longs to the non-disabled employee who has a "vested priority right" to the
position.'
Supp. at 899 (observing that undue hardship defense is better means of justiying employer's
failure to reassign under ADA).
291. 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999).
292. See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1164 (10th Cir. 1999) (en bane)
(concluding ADA requires employers to place qualified disabled employees in vacant positions
regardless of availability of better-qualified non-disabled employees and applicants).
293. Id. at 1175-76.
294. Id. at 1176 (citations omitted).
295. Id.
296. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (listing courts that have adopted per se rule
that CBA's seniority provision trumps ADA's reassignment accommodation).
297. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (listing courts that have adopted per se rule
that CBA's seniority provision trumps ADA's reassignment accommodation).
298. See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1175 (10th Cir. 1999) (en bane)
(quoting Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118,1125 (10th Cir. 1995)).
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A general rule in favor of neutral transfer and assignment policies simi-
ly is justified because of the greater losses non-disabled employees sustain
in this context as compared to the previously discussed situation in which an
employer must choose between a disabled employee and a beter-qualified
applicant or employee. In the employer policy setting, other employees de-
velop "legitimate expectations" in the policy's provisions.' An employer's
consistent application of such policies promotes fairness and predictability, as
well as creating genuine incentives for the workforce as a whole. In contrast,
a non-disabled applicant or employee who simply applies for a vacant position
for which other applicants also are applying does not have a similar guarantee
or expectation that the non-disabled applicant or employee will get the job.
Finally, from the employer's standpoint, the general rule preserves an
employer's ability to adopt facially neutral policies in the management of the
employer's enterprise. Most anti-discrimination statutes, including the ADA,
recognize the legitimacy of such non-discriminatory policies so long as the
policies are shown to serve legitimate business needs."°° As the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded in Dalton, a contrary rule voiding
neutral employer policies would result in "an unreasonable imposition on
[both] the employers and coworkers of disabled employees." '
Thus, transfer and assignment policies that serve a legitimate business
purpose and do not unduly restrict an employer's ability otherwise to comply
with the ADA's reassignment mandate generally should be upheld. A well-
established seniority system, even if not rooted in a CBA, is an example of a
policy that an employer should not be required to violate in order to comply
with the ADA if doing so would unreasonably trammel on the "legitimate
expectations" of more senior employees." Similarly, the no-demotion policy
299. See Smith, 180 F.3d at 1176 (recognizing that current employees might possess "well-
established reasonable expectations of seniority rights").
300. In essence, a rule recognizing the validity of non-discriminatory transfer and assign-
ment policies is similar to the business necessity defense recognized for cases of disparate
impact under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(kX1XA)(i) (1994) (providing defense to claim
of disparate impact in which "the challenged practice is job related for the position in question
and consistent with business necessity"). The ADA expressly incorporates the business neces-
sity defense. Id. § 12113(a). Specifically, the ADA provides:
It may be a defense to a charge of discrimination under this chapter that an alleged
application of qualification standards, tests, or selection criteria that screen out or
tend to screen out or otherwise deny a job or benefit to an individual with a disabil-
ity has been shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity.
Id.
301. See Dalton v. Subaru-IsuzuAuto, Inc., 141 F.3d 667,679 (7th Cir. 1998) (concluding
employers not required to abandon legitimate, neutral employment practices and policies under
ADA).
302. See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1176 (10th Cir. 1999) (en bane)
(noting industry may have "well entrenched" seniority system that gives rise to legitimate expec-
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in DuckeI303 and the transfer preference for full-time workers in Daugherty
also would appear to pass muster under the Smith rationale."'
Of course, the general rule favoring neutral employer policies should not
be absolute. As the Smith court explained, this general rule should not apply
to policies that wholly eviscerate the reassignment accommodation:
On the other hand, other policies of an employer might have to be subordi-
nated to an employer's reassignment obligationunderthe ADAbecause to
do otherwise would essentially vitiate the employer's express statutory
obligationto employreassignmentas aform ofreasonable accommodation.
An obvious example wouldbe where an employer has apolicy against ever
reassigning an employee to other positions within the company. Such a
policy, if allowed to trump the ADA, would read out of the act the provi-
sion that reassignment is one of the appropriate reasonable accommoda-
tions?
°5
In addition to a no-transfer policy,06 a policy to hire only the most qualified
applicant 3°' or to require all employees to compete for vacant positions also
would appear to "essentially vitiate" the ADA's reassignment obligation.s
As such, an employer should be required to make an exception to such poli-
cies in order to reassign a qualified individual with a disability.
A further limitation should be recognized in order to ensure that the
policy in question is a bona fide personnel practice of that employer. The
employer, accordingly, should be required to demonstrate that the policy in
tations of more senior employees to employment positions that disabled employees might
desire); see also Barnett v. U.S. Air Lines, Inc., 196 F-3d 979, 983 (9th Cir. 1999) (concluding
ADA requires "no more than equality among disabled and nondisabled employees in hiring and
reassignment decisions").
303. See supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text (discussing "no rollback" policy).
304. See supra notes 205-13 and accompanying text (discussing legitimacy of discrimina-
tory non-transfer and reassignment policies).
305. See Smith, 180 F.3d at 1176 (exploring scope of employer reassignment accommoda-
tion duties under ADA), see also Dalton, 141 F.3d at 679 ("An employer, cannot, of course,
convert its responsibility to look to a 'broad range' of jobs into a 'narrow band' simply by
adopting a 'no transfer' policy.").
306. See Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116, 1131-32 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding municipal
employer's no-transfer policy violated ADA reassignment obligations); see also supra notes 96-
99 and accompanying text (discussing Enforcement Guidance's position on no-transfer poli-
cies).
307. See supra note 217 and accompanying text (discussing scope of employer obligations
under ADA). For all the reasons discussed in Part IV.A, reassignment truly would become a
hollow promise for qualified individuals with disabilities if an employer could simply create a
policy to choose the most qualified applicant for the position.
308. See Ransom v. Ariz. Bd. Of Regents, 983 F. Supp. 895, 899 (D. Ariz. 1997) (holding
employer's policy requiring qualified disabled employees to compete with all other applicants
for vacant positions violates ADA reassignment provision).
1093
57 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1045 (2000)
question is truly an established one? 9 An employer should not be able to
avoid reassigning a disabled individual by simply pointing to a policy that the
employer never uses or which is created spontaneously once a disabled
individual requests reassignment. The general rule, finally, should not apply
if evidence demonstrates that the employer has made previous exceptions to
the policy for other, non-disabled employees.
310
VT. Conclusion
The ADA has experienced a troubled infancy since its genesis less than
a decade ago. The Act has spawned a deluge of litigation, and circuit splits
exist on numerous issues. The recent conflict over whether reassignment is
tantamount to a prohibited preference in favor of the disabled has created
additional confusion in the federal courts. Although similarities can be drawn
between affirmative action and reasonable accommodation, significant differ-
ences inthe statutory text, practicalities, and policies ofthe ADA demonstrate
that justifying an employer's failure to accommodate disabled individuals on
affirmative action grounds is misplaced. The debate must move beyond the
rhetorical debate and towards establishing workable boundaries for defining
the scope of the reassignment accommodation. If reasonable lines can be
drawn, employers will enjoy greater predictability and fewer lawsuits, and the
ADA can better fulfill its promise of providing disabled individuals with
meaningful protection in the American workplace.
309. See, e.g., Adams v. Henderson, 45 F. Supp. 2d 968, 979-80 (M.D. Fla. 1999) (deny-
ing employer motion for summary judgment because plaintiff employee sufticiently raised
material fact as to whether employer had business policy in place before plaintiff requested
reassignment).
310. See id. (noting evidence suggesting employer had applied its policy in ad hoc fashion,
providing exceptions to non-disabled employees).
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